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This study aims to examine the effects of structural adjustment programs imposed by 
IMF and World Bank to Tunisian authority in order to stabilize the macroeconomic 
variables in the short run and to open the economy in order to integrate the world 
economy in the long run. 
 
Indeed Tunisia as a country in the process of development has been since its 
independence reliance on external financing. Indebtedness has been mastering and has 
continued adverse economic factors; it took such magnitude that the structural 
adjustment program makes it suggested by the IMF. The SAPs introduced in 1986 
aimed, through sectoral reforms, to reduce aggregate demand and stimulates aggregate 
supply and thus reduces the persistent balance of payments deficit. Approval of 
international monetary fund to development countries and especially Tunisia has 
become more indispensable to enable them to rebuild their external accounts. 
The objective of my study is to analyze the economic situation of Tunisia before 
and after the implementation of structural adjustment programs which spread from 1986 
to 1999. 
we proceed, to explain the origins and characteristics of SAPs suggested by the World 
Bank and IMF, first, and in the second part of the work we elaborate on the case of 
Tunisia, by using tables and graphs that illustrates the performance of macroeconomic 
variables in several areas after the introduction of sectoral reforms, the third part will be 
devoted to give an outlook to the Tunisian economy and if it has been integrated in the 
international economy and what should be done in order to ensure a full integration with 










The supreme power almighty ‘Allah’ made it possible for me to study and write this 
thesis. 
Completion of this thesis would have not been possible without the help and generous 
support of some very wonderful people .I’m particularly grateful to my advisor, Dr Yoo 
Jong II for his guidance and moral support. With his constructive criticism and insight, 
he has taught me to think and write more analytically. I am also thankful to colleagues 
for taking time to review my draft and their helpful suggestions on improving this 
paper;  
I am also grateful to my friends in Korea for making my study at the KDI School of 
public policy and management such a rewarding experience. I will always be indebted 
to them for their loving support and understanding and for enriching my life in so many 
ways:  
Furthermore, all the librarians at our school always assisted me in finding the required 
books, articles and journals. I am grateful to all these people in particular, along with 
every member of the school for all the cooperation, help and assistance extended to me, 
which facilitated the successful completion of my studies. I am also thankful to the 
officials of my government especially ministry of development and international 
cooperation , the national institute of statistics and the central bank , for providing me 
appropriate materials and guidance . 
I would like to thank the many professors who have contributed to my understanding of 
economic development issues. 
Finally special thanks go to my colleagues whom I consider my friends for their warm 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………1 
1. Research objectives 
2. Research questions 
3. The significance of the study 
 
Chapter 2: What are the structural adjustment programs?....................................6 
 
I. Bretton Woods institutions and origin of the programs : 
II. Structural adjustment programs: 
III. Characteristics of SAPs: 
IV. Criticism of SAPs: 
V. Literature on evaluation of SAPs and controversies: 
 
Chapter 3: The Tunisian Structural Adjustment Program……………………….19 
 
I.      Situation pre-adjustment: 
II.      IMF conditionality: 
III.      Implementation of SAPs &Liberalization of Tunisian economy : 
 
A.      Deregulation: 
B.      Tax reform: 
C.      Privatization: 
D.      Evaluation and financing of privatization program: 
E.      Economic and financial policies: 
F.      Sectors and social policy : 
G.      Macroeconomic policy and Stabilization 
Chapter 4: Performances of Tunisian economy and analysis of SAPs effects….76 
 
I.      Situation before any reforms: 
II.      Realization after the reforms of 1986-1997: 
III.      Global analysis of effects of SAPs on Tunisian economy till 2001 : 
IV.      Social performances  after SAPs compared to pre-adjustment period: 
V.      Achievement and performance of Tunisian economy during the 
decade 1997-2006: 
 





















1. Agreements                                                        29 
2. Growth of direct taxes                                                41 
3. General view of privatization                                          45 
4. Part of foreign investments broken down by sector of activity                 53 
5. The privatization operations till 2000                                    54 
6. Privatization by sectors                                               55 
7. Privatization manners                                                56 
8. Repaired business                                                   56 
9. Interest rate evolution                                                71 
10. Inflation rate                                                        72 
11. Monetary indicators                                                  73 
12. Evolution of macroeconomic key indicators                               86 
13. Evolution of main economic indicators in the 9th plan                       89 
14. Evolution of trade                                                    90 
15. Macroeconomic variables at the end of 9th plan                            91 
16. 8th and 9th plan comparison                                            92 
17. Growth of GDP by sector (8th and 9th plan)                               93 
18. GDP growth by sectors                                                94 
19. GDP growth rates                                                    96 
20. Population split by level of education                                    96 
21. Working population split by level of education                             97 
22. Health environment, access to electricity and drinking water                  97 



















1. growth of indirect taxes                                              39 
2. growth of direct taxes                                                41 
3. taxes burden                                                       44 
4. Share of foreign investment in privatization receipts till 31-03-2000           53 











The experience of adjustment in Tunisia in the period 1986-1999 provides a useful overview of 
the macroeconomic and structural policies that have allowed the authorities to restore the balance 
of payments while transforming an economy heavily regulated to an economy more oriented 
towards the market and exports. Implementation of this program in Tunisia was under the aegis 
of the IMF and World Bank, enrolled at the evidence in a difficult economic context. Moreover, 
the previous delays of such a program, generating an amplification of the financial crisis, have 
made indispensable. 
In the 7th and 8th plan Tunisia has set ambitious targets to support a high rate of economic 
growth needed to improve the quality of life and address the problem of unemployment while 
continuing the effort to reduce inflation and increase foreign trade. That said, even if the creation 
of jobs remained at the same level during the period of adjustment with growth of the workforce, 
braking sustainable rate of unemployment requires significant reforms that have been coming in 
the future years. 
Facing difficulties of economic barriers for the development in the developing countries such as 
Tunisia for years, the persistent deficits in their balance of payment, the accumulation of external 
debts and the loss of their borrowing capacity, the downstream IMF for these countries have 
become more than indispensable to enable them to address their external accounts. 
To meet the financial aid to Tunisia, IMF should know the causes of such deficiency, to evaluate 
and quantify the necessary steps to remedy it, it was this condition that only he could tell whether 
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the policies of this restoring balance and pay in strict subordination to the negative financial 
assistance has strengthened. 
However, a literature has employed in recent years to examine the effects of the adjustments 
proposed by the fund on the economies of third world countries. The findings of this review, we 
suspected, are far from being consistent. They range from full approval to this method as 
cohesion less criticism made by those who believe that these organism policies are too restrictive, 
too uniform and ultimately prejudicial to economic growth. 
My proposal is not to position myself vis a vis these reviews was somewhat unfair and unsubtle, 
but to try to analyze the real impact of stabilization policies of the IMF on economic growth and 
social level in Tunisia. 
The main interest for the first part of this work which attempts to show how major economic 
reforms known as structural adjustment programs that have been proposed or imposed on third 
world countries, since the '80s, have caused, raises or model all other reforms, including social 
reforms. The question is whether this broad reform plan, designed and led by the Bretton Woods 
institutions includes goals of social fairness? 
To answer this question, we must first look at what is settled structural policy: what are the 
origins and philosophy, these objectives and characteristics? We will then be able to ask 
ourselves what are the impacts of these policies on social programs. Thirdly, to trace the 
different stages, we should follow the various steps that have leaded the international financial 
institutions and the elite bankers who heads, has involved a medical mission in the Third World. 
The presentation of Tunisia, its economic and social situation before any reform will be 
necessary for the comprehension of different components of our study. 
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This study focused on the SAPs applied along the period 1986-1999 and its effects on the 
Tunisian economy and prospective to integrate the global economy, this part will be divided into 
three subparts which constitute the bulk of our analysis. 
So the first part will involve the introduction of SAPs  and their origin then an analysis of the 
Tunisian economy, a description of its pre-adjustment economic situation is better now, however, 
essential to understand the challenges of structural adjustment program in Tunisia. In effect, like 
a number of signatory countries of structural adjustment programs, Tunisia has managed its first 
phase for the restoration of the main macro-economic (reduction of inflation, budget deficit, the 
debt service and restoration of growth), all the time, the second phase which represent the  
structural reforms including liberalization (foreign trade and public sector) is the linchpin 
remains partial. Tunisia was in timidly encouraging privatization. 
The priority in the privatization process was for public enterprises of small and medium sizes. 
FTA (Free Trade Area) is deemed to give a boost to adjustment by speeding up the privatization 
component. This could be translated only by a reinforcement of heavy tendencies to work since 
the early '80s to know the deepening of social inequality and the weakening of the regulatory 
function of the state. 
The second part is a synthesis realization and performances of Tunisian economy, then 
realizations of 9th plan of development in the three volumes: overall, sectoral and regional. It has 
two parts: the first part deals with the achievements and key lessons derived from preceding plan 
(1992-1996), the broad guidelines of the 9th plan and its achievement to make the transition to 
regional integration and the first steps to broad the openness of the economy, the pattern of 




The focus is more on quantitative aspects, analysis of the main characteristics of the scenario of 
development and the basic data relating to different sectors of economic and social activity both 
nationally and regionally and especially the performance of Tunisian economy. 
The final part of this study is more accurate and will focus on the period stretching from 1997-
2006, it studies and forecasts the accomplishments of the 10th plan and the outlook of the 11th 
plan which has as a primary objective, international economic integration and the complete 
liberalization of foreign trade and relationship in the context of regional and international 
environment. 
The last chapter will be preserved to recommendations and conclusions. 
1. Research objectives 
 
The object of our study is to analyze the economic situation of Tunisia before and after the 
implementation of structural adjustment and how IMF helped Tunisian authority to make a 
structural change. I will evaluate the performance of Tunisian economy within the IMF 
intervention, and then I will trace meticulously the challenges for the Tunisian economy and the 
prospect of its integration in the world economy. 
   2.  Research questions 
Apart from what I have mentioned above these particular research questions are outlined for this 
study: 
? What are the origins of structural adjustment program? 
? Did the adjustment program suggested by IMF and World Bank was successful for 
Tunisian economy? 
? Did Tunisia benefited a lot from this program and the structural change was helpful for 
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stabilization and growth? 
? Did the SAPs helped Tunisian economy to integrate the world economy? 
? What are the negative effects of SAPs on Tunisian economy and society? 
    3.  The significance of the study 
As mentioned above, Tunisia is among the few countries that the WB and IMF consider it as a 
successful model for development in the developing world. Taking this into consideration it can 
be said that Tunisia has realized a great change in its economic situation in the last two decades. 
Despite this fact, there are few studies conducted in the recent years to evaluate the SAPs 
conducted in Tunisia and their effects on the Tunisian economy and society. 
This study aims to clarify the results of SAPs conducted in Tunisia and the tools used to change 
the nature of regulated economy to a market oriented one. We will explain the political 
instrument of economic and financial reform and evaluate its impact on the performance of the 
whole economy by pursuing the behavior of certain macroeconomic variables. Such a job gives 
scientific analyses to the success or failure of IMF and Tunisian authority in term of changing the 
nature of the economy within stabilization and growth which was improved since 1986. 
This study may attribute to provide some understanding on the performance of Tunisian 
economy. 
Moreover, this study may become an important source for researchers to undertake more studies 






What are the structural adjustment programs? 
 
 
In this chapter I will introduce the Bretton woods institutions by focusing on the change of 
their policy after early 1970 and the origin of the SAPs as a tool to adjust developing economies 
to the global demand, and then I will give a clear picture about SAPs, their characteristics and 
the principles of the assessment of these programs in developing countries and the controversy 
related to these assessments. 
I. Bretton Woods institutions and origin of the programs 
  
Issued from the meeting of Bretton Woods at the end of WWII, IMF and WB are multilateral 
organization that their objective overlaps and complete: 
The IMF which established in 1946 in order to ensure stability of exchange rates and to 
financially support temporary balance of payment deficits. When it was founded in 1944, IMF 
was assumed on fundamental insights of Keynesianism, its first and main mission was to 
stabilize the international monetary system. After the Second World War, the IMF’s main goal 
was to help prevent another worldwide depression like that of the 1930s. That depression was 
caused by a liquidity failure1. The IMF was intended to counter this by lending money to some 
                                      
1  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 24, No. 3 (August 1992)  
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countries and pressuring others to pursue more expansionary policies. However, the IMF’s policy 
against the debtor countries changed after the collapse of Bretton Wood’s system2.  
The 1980s were marked by severe strains in the international economy which witness many 
balance of payment problem for developing countries. External financing slowed to a trickle for 
many countries while primary commodity prices dropped sharply. Thus, most of the developing 
countries had balance of payments problems and that as a result the IMF lending rose to 
unprecedented levels during the late 1980s. One of the key functions of the IMF is to restore 
investor and consumer confidence in countries facing macroeconomic imbalances, through 
structural adjustment programs3.  
“IMF is not an aid organization, it is not a development organization, it is not into projects or 
anything of that kind, it is there as a purveyor of macroeconomic advice, balance of payments 
support with conditionality attached to its aid to try and encourage good macroeconomic 
government. Short loans are the main instrument through which the fund provides concessional 
finance to the poorest countries”.4 
The changing role of the fund from providing shorter funds for macroeconomic stabilization 
to providing medium term finance for structural adjustment to achieve growth and poverty 
reduction objectives has blurred the distinction between it and the World Bank. 
                                      
2  Gowa, J. (1983) Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.  
3  IMF working paper”effect of IMFstructural adjustment programs on expectations: the case of transition 
economies” p 3 
4  Angela Wood , “The IMF’s enhanced structural adjustment facility: what role for development 
“ September 1997  
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In the same sense the World Bank which was created in 1944 to rebuild Europe and Japan 
under the Marshall plan after WWII (IBRD)5, provides financial and technical assistance to 
emerging market countries. This usually has occurred when their economies are in danger of 
default through overspending, extensive borrowing, which often leads to hyperinflation and 
devaluation of its currency. The World Bank is not actually a bank in the common sense. Instead, 
it is made up of two development institutions owned by 186 member countries—the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA). The World Bank provides low-interest loans, interest-free 
credits and grants to developing countries. In return, the country must adhere to strict budgetary 
reforms. It must agree to cut back on spending and support its currency. The World Bank loans 
are usually to invest in education, health, and infrastructure. The loans can also be used to 
modernize a country's financial sector, agriculture, and natural resource management. In its side 
the WB was viewed as to encourage international investment and provide it with additional 
marginal complement. 
In 1979 in a situation which they themselves had contributed to create it, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, deviated significantly from their original functions6, considering that it was time for 
their jurisdiction to proceed to an overall transformation of the economies of Third World to 
adjust to the demands of global market. IMF has practically abandoned the role of providing 
liquidity to both developing and developed countries. Instead it has become half development 
agency, half loan drawing rescheduling facility, and a down-market policeman enforcing sound 
macroeconomic policies on small, poor countries. This change in focus was precipitated by the 
                                      
5  The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
6  See the web site :http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty 
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development of structural adjustment programs and was reinforced by the establishment of the 
SAP facility in 1986 and the enhanced structural adjustment facility in 1987. 
Indeed, most under-developed countries which, during the 70s, enjoyed unlimited supply of 
capital are so heavily indebted. Trapped in development on credit, they had no choice to continue 
in the same way and obtain new loans, only to submit to the conditionality of the Bank and the 
Fund. It was Robert McNamara7, President proactive of World Bank from 1968 to 1981, who in 
1979 inaugurated the era of structural adjustment which dominates till 1998, more than ever, the 
theory and practice of the Bretton Woods’s institutions and IFIs in general. The philosophy 
underlying the policy of structural adjustment begin from an incontestable fact: The third world 
economies are not adapted to the world economy as it is practiced today, as it is unthinkable that 
world economy adjusts to the structures of economies often powered, it must proceed to the 
opposite; adjusting these economically obsolete to international economic system. This is the 
optimal goal of SAPs; hang underdeveloped economies to world market or, more precisely, of 
forging a single global market, based on roughly the current division of labor8, Generalization of 
global free competition and free trade. 
II. Structural adjustment programs: 
 
Structural adjustment is a term used to describe the policy changes implemented by the 
international monetary fund and the World Bank in developing countries. These policy changes 
                                      
7  April 1968 - June 1981 : Expansionist with a social consciousness. "...indefatigable builder and wielder of influence on behalf of 
the Bank and the development cause."  - Banker's with a Mission: The Presidents of the World Bank, 1946-91, J. Kraske, 1996. “Robert 
McNamara shaped the Bank as no one before him. He came to the Bank brimming with energy, forceful, active, pushing to get things done. He 
brought with him the firm belief that the problems of the developing world could be solved. What was needed was clear analysis of the problems 
and determination in the application of appropriate remedies. If this happened, success could not fail to materialize.” 
8  Colin Stoneman, "The world bank and IMF in Zimbabwe", dans bonnie K.campbell et john loxley, structural adjustment in africa.st 
Martin's Press , New York,1989, p 44  
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are conditions for getting new loans from IMF or World Bank, or for obtaining lower interest 
rates on existing loans which was hardly accumulated. Conditionality is implemented to ensure 
that the money lent will be spent in accordance with the overall goals of the loan, especially for 
structural change and macroeconomic stabilities. The SAPs are created with goal of reducing the 
borrowing country’s fiscal imbalance. Through conditionality, SAPs try to implement “free 
market” programs and policy. These programs include internal changes (privatization and 
deregulation) as well as external ones (stabilization, openness of the economy to outside), 
especially the reduction of trade barriers. Countries which fail to enact these programs may be 
subject to severe fiscal discipline. 
This policy is implemented under the structural adjustment programs supported by sectoral and 
specific loans from the bank and the fund and since their inception in 1979; over 50 billion U.S. 
dollars have been spent on these programs by both institutions. From 1980 to, 1991, the IMF has 
conducted 325 Adjustment Loan9 and the World Bank, 24110. The bank continues to spend more 
than US $ 5 billion every year in this type of credit. In addition to this already considerable 
money come clumping requires the contribution of the countries concerned, as well as 
contributions from many donors, such as regional development banks and national agencies of 
international cooperation.  
Adjustment policy is implemented using two kinds of loans: 
? Structural adjustment loans which designed three specific objectives: 
1) Mitigate the debt crisis by reducing the deficit and expenditure; 
                                      
9  IMF statistics  
10  See “ Norm Setting or Following: The World Bank and the IMF in Comparison”, Antje Vetterlein Department of 
SociologyUniversity of EssexWivenhoe ParkColchester CO4 3SQ  
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2) Increase exports by converting natural resources into exportable products of the 
country, in a context of globalization and debt repayment; 
3) Encourage the establishment of multinationals in the economies as too inward on 
itself. 
? Sector Adjustment Loans that attack, one by one, whole sectors of national economy 
such as energy, agriculture, industry and more recently health. Conditions attached to 
these loans determine policies and national priorities in the concerned sector. 
 
III. Characteristics of SAPs: 
 
Requirements of the fund and the bank are formulated in economic conditionality would be 
reflected in measures which aim at ensuring achievement of the objectives mentioned above. 
These measures can be grouped into the following major points: 
? Primacy has a restrictive monetary policy which aims to reduce inflation; 
? Incentives to exports to earn foreign exchange needed to balanced budgets and debt 
repayment; 
? Liberalization of wages, prices (especially agricultural), interest rates and laws 
(especially those concerning foreign investments and the transfer of profits); 
? privatization of enterprises and public services, given that the economy should be 
organized by the "invisible hand" of the market and not by politicians and officials; 
? Reduction of administrative bureaucracy and expenditure in sectors or cuts do not 
directly affect the economy, according to international experts, it is the areas of health, 




IV. Criticism of SAPs: 
 
Critics claim that SAPs threaten the sovereignty of national economies because an outside 
organization is dictating a nation’s economic policy. Critics argue that the creation of good 
policy is in a sovereign nation’s own best interest also some evaluation study related the success 
or failure of these programs to domestic political-economy factors 11 . Thus, SAPs are 
unnecessary. While public debt in developing and developed countries face a much more 
vulnerable position to maintain an equilibrated balance of payments, with some of the world’s 47 
poorest nations already 422$ billion debt in 2003.12 
Due to this near universality of debt, a popular criticism is that structural adjustment’s terms have 
become a template for the governance of much of humanity. Hence , some argue that the 
democratic policy process of countless countries has been undermined by decisions formulated 
miles away by western economic bureaucrats and that the implementation of such policy has 
solely benefited the largest donor countries( the U.S, U.K, Canada , Japan)13 for example, the 
opening of countries to outside investment allows U.S companies to build factories in 
impoverished areas. The corporations are able to exploit the surplus of inexpensive labor, and 
usual lack of environmental regulation to create goods at a lower price14. As a result, corporate 
profits rise and trade flows increase for that particular country .While this increases the GDP and 
                                      
11  What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?  David Dollar and Jakob Svensson ,The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 110, No. 466 (Oct., 2000), pp. 894-917 
12  See the factsheet on : http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm  
13  See the factsheet” IMF lending” on :http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm 
14  See the web site ;http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm 
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the majority of the profit actually benefits the corporation and the country in which the 
corporation is based (the developed country always). Conversely many argue that the people 
employed by the corporations are desperately in need of any work at all, that the alternative 
forms of employment or life styles available to them are much worse.15Another claim for SAPs 
is that the common policy for these programs is privatization of state owned industries and 
resources. Ostensibly, this policy aims to increase efficiency and investment, and decrease state 
spending. State-owned resources are to be sold whether they generate a fiscal profit or not. 
Critics, however, have condemned privatization requirements. When resources are transferred to 
foreign corporations and/or national elites, the goal of public prosperity is replaced with the goal 
of private accumulation. Furthermore, SOE may show fiscal losses because they fulfill a wider 
social role, such as providing low-cost utilities and jobs. The agriculture, anti-land reform and 
food trade policies associated with SAPs have been pointed to as a major engine in the 
urbanization of the global south, the ballooning of megacities, worldwide migration towards the 
global north, and the growth in urban poverty and slums. A large portion of SAPs policy on 
agriculture focuses on the increased use of fertilizers and pesticides which harm the health of 
local bodies of water and therefore fish populations. The runoffs caused by the over use of 
fertilizers increase the amount of algae in local water bodies causing different scales of dead 
zones. Local environments can easily become casualties of pro-trade policies. Pro-trade policy 
promotes an increase of industry geared toward western needs. As a result of the new policy, 
local industries begin to focus on producing inexpensive goods to sell on the international market. 
The focus on creating the least expensive product often leads to environmentally exploitative 
industry. As these new industries are often unregulated there are no laws prohibiting this 
                                      
15  http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm  
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exploitation. As a result, the environmental cost of producing a product like steel in china is 
much greater, than it would be in the U.S16.Another example would be the run off of chemicals 
or pharmaceuticals into local rivers and other bodies of water. In developing nations the 
pollution of rivers has become a cause for international intervention (Haiti 2010). This pollution 
not only affects local populations who sometimes bathe and drink the polluted waters but is also 
damaging the oceans on a large scale.17 It is possible for SAPs to include clauses that require 
industry regulations. However, for the most part, regulatory clauses have not been included in 
SAPs. The majority of the policy creators view these regulations as a hindrance to trade and 
therefore to economic development18. In addition, many argue that it is unfair for developed 
nations and IFIs to demand that there environmental policy be followed. All developed nations 
have gone through a period of industrialization where the local environments were damaged. 
While these periods of industrialization led to increased environmental problems, they also 
greatly attributed to the development, prosperity, and increased standard of living for the 
country’s citizens. They argue that developed countries essentially have had a head start in 
economic development, and that less developed countries deserve their own head start19. Critics 
debate whether the world can handle this head start. It has been argued that developing countries 
would benefit more from debt cancellation than an industrial “head start”. 
Critics hold SAPs responsible for much of the economic stagnation that has occurred in 
borrowing countries. SAPs emphasize maintaining a balanced budget which forces austerity 
                                      
16  Steger, Manfred. "Globlization A Very Short Introduction" Oxford University Press, 2003 
17  O'Meara, Patrick. Mehlinger, Howard. Krain, Matthew. "Globalization and the Challenges of a New 
Century" Indiana University Press, 2000 
18  O'Meara, Patrick. Mehlinger, Howard. Krain, Matthew. 
19  The developing countries should have their ownership strategies that born from them 
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programs. The casualties of balancing a budget are often social programs. The programs most 
often cut are education, public health, and other miscellaneous social safety nets. Commonly, 
these are programs that are already underfunded and desperately need monetary investment for 
improvement. For example, if a government cuts education funding, universality is impaired, and 
therefore long term economic growth. Similarly, cuts to health programs have allowed diseases 
such as AIDS to devastate some areas’ economies by destroying the workforce. 
Since the implementation of traditional SAPs in the late 1970’s the global gap between rich and 
poor has been steadily increasing20. Critics cite not only SAPs but the fact that they promote neo-
liberal ideas, and therefore corporations. The sole goal of a corporation is to lower costs and 
maximize profits. As a result, corporations contribute to the availability of goods at a lower cost, 
and thus arguably an increase in the standards of living. Yet in their cost consciousness, such 
policies also decrease wages. So while goods and services cost less, people generally earn less. 
SAPs have also contributed to the disparities between developed countries, and developing one, 
or the north and the south. The IFIs that provide need based loans still receive interest on the 
payments which harm the economic situation and the autonomy of the state making it in a 
continuous dependence. 
With the adoption of SAPs comes a withdrawal from social spending. With less money going 
towards education, health, welfare, and local infrastructure, local people are burdened with 
increasing responsibility to provide for their villages and cities.  
                                      




In total theses SAPs have been heavily criticized for many years for resulting in poverty, 
however SAPs have revealed little ability to reduce poverty by accelerating growth, partly 
because of extensive slippage in implementation21. In addition, for developing world countries, 
there has been an increased dependency on the richer nations22. This is despite the IMF and 
World Bank’s claim that they will reduce poverty. However the inverse happens in developing 
countries because the IMF and World Bank have demanded that poor nations lower the standard 
of living of their people and they demand them to pay back their increased debt, so the problem 
continue, moreover the SAPs limit the capacity of local enterprises to grow because those which 
can participate in these tender that come from loans and credit of SAPs are always great 
companies of foreign countries and usually developed countries, by this manner local industry 
will be limited to small and medium enterprises which cannot innovate and export easily, so the 
competitiveness of local industry will be harmed by those foreign companies which have the 
technology and knowhow. This approach theoretically can harm growth of local economy and 
limit its activities to non high added value industries. 
V. Literature on evaluation of SAPs and controversies 
 
The SAPs has come under increased scrutiny and attack, with some of the most intense criticisms 
targeting the link between these programs and reduced economic growth in borrower countries 
(e.g. Przeworski and Vreeland 2000, Hutchison 2003). The channels by which the IMF could 
influence growth, however, have rarely been made explicit and it was seen as new policy to 
impose conditions on developing countries in order to increase their export of natural resources. 
                                      
21  Making Adjustment Work for the Poor,  Tony Killick ODI 1999. 
22  Making Adjustment Work for the Poor Tony Killick 5 may 1999. p3  
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The fact of change of policy of Bretton woods institutions also increased incredibility among 
countries receiving loans on their goals and trust. 
It is striking to observe a certain degree of continuity in many of the criticisms leveled against 
the IMF right from its early encounters with the developing world. The traditional criticisms of 
the IMF have typically highlighted the inappropriate mix of conditions and incentives embodied 
in its programs designed to accomplish balance of payments adjustment. Countries, which 
approached the IMF in a situation of acute balance of payments crisis, found themselves 
confronted with rather harsh conditions with inadequate incentives to apply the mix of 
expenditure switching and expenditure reducing policies. Despite this critics addressed to SAPs 
designers; some scholars provided some assessments and analysis of the effect of these programs 
on the developing countries’ economies, firstly to achieve stabilization targets and the whole 
effects on the growth.  
Many studies shows that almost the countries adopting the SAPs of IMF between 1980 and 1990 
witnessed a fall of their per capita income and increase in poverty. Others reviews about 
stabilization found that SAPs have had little effect in terms of the macroeconomic changes they 
are intended to bring out. 
Killick (1995) finds little evidence confirming the significant effects of SAPs on macroeconomic 
stabilization. killick also think that the SAPs was designed without growth objectives in mind 
(kellick 1993), he extensively criticize the IMF model arguing that it’s based on weak 
assumptions, in the same sense Woodward 1992 criticize the model used by IMF arguing that 
developing countries have no capacity to implement such programs and it’s not suited to the 
economic circumstance facing developing countries. 
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Frances Stewart(1995),reviewing the empirical evidence from the 1980s on the macroeconomic 
impacts of IMF & WB SAPs’s shows that , on the whole , there have been balance of payments 
improvement ; there is no clear influence on inflation or growth ; and there are negative impact 
on investment . In the same study he finds out that there is small effect on growth. David Dollar 
and Jakob Svensson (October 2000) explain the success or failure of SAPs by using a sample of 
220 programs, they find that success depend on domestic political-economy forces. Mohsin S. 
Khan (jun1990) find that in the short run programs have led to improvement in the current 
account, balance of payment, a lowering in inflation, and a decline in growth. In the long run the 
positive effects on the external balance and inflation are strengthened and the adverse growth 
effect reduced. In the same way William Easterly (November 2003) try to find a correlation 
between SAPs and growth, he find that almost countries failed to achieve growth and 
stabilization. The WB in his report of development in 1981 indicates that successful adjustment 
implies “a minimum sacrifice of income Growth”.23 However two recent studies (Przeworski 
and Vreeland, 2000; Barro and Lee, (2002) find a significantly negative effect of IMF lending on 
growth. 
This variety of studies in fact shows that SAPs was not successful in general and there is doubt 
on their effect on the long run for the economy performance and structural change, also they was 
similar, without relation to the context within which they are used, means that there is no 
specification for each country situation; the same tools to achieve the same goals for different 
situations that depend on each country’s economy. 
To clarify this ambiguity for the case of Tunisia, we will use the method before and after to 
evaluate the effect of SAPs on the economic situation of Tunisia. 
                                      
23  World Bank (1981a,b), p. 4. 
18 
 
 Chapter 3 
The Tunisian Structural Adjustment Program 
 
I will try in this chapter to analyze the situation of Tunisian economy before the implementation 
of SAPs and the causes that led to its implementation , then we will describe and analyze the 
process of its implementation , especially the deregulation and privatization process which 
represent the bulk of  IMF and world bank model tools to achieve the designed goals .we will 
evaluate SAPs using the method before and after the implementation of these programs by 
pursuing the behavior of certain macroeconomic variables such as GDP, Growth rate, Domestic 
savings, Budget deficit….in each plan of development between 1987 and 2001 , also we will 
pursue some sectors evolution within investments and of course some social indicators. 
IMF proposed a several reform to Tunisian economy such as The tax reforms which was 
engaged by the government in 1988, particularly the institution of the value added tax (VAT), 
which allowed an adjustment of public finance, a re-establishment of the external accounts and a 
significant retreat of inflation, this reforms was successful in term of limiting inflation . Others 
reforms were suggested to Tunisian authority such as: widening of the taxable amount, 
suppression of the grants on the foodstuffs, reduction in the wage bill of the public sector, 
privatization, deregulation and disengagement of state.  
We will try to explain and analyze each operation effect on Tunisian economy in general and its 




I. Situation pre-adjustment: 
 
During the period of pre-adjustment we can split up the process of development in two periods in 
accordance with various policy measures that were adopted: i) 1961-1970, the socialist period 
and ii) 1971-1986, the mixed economy period; 
Indeed Tunisia was chosen since its independence in 1956, to periodically elaborate a 
development plans which is an economic policy framework for the realization of goals that are 
consistent with economic growth and social progress of the country. Every time it adopts a 
strategy of state control of production through a series of regulations through the successive 
development plans and the establishment of a major public sector. In the same time, Tunisia has 
focused on the development of human resources, the establishment of a public health system and 
social security which was reinforced in each decade of development process. 
1. The socialist period ( 1961-1970): 
 
This period was the first step to build the economy; it was dominated by a strong socialist 
orientation based on centralized planning and importation substitution strategy. The private 
sector was very poor to create any economic role, the state was obliged to create a cooperative 
sector that become widespread and played a great role to  reinforce the base of economy 
especially agriculture and main basic infrastructures , the major investment was taken by 
government , indeed 67% of investment were undertaken by the public sector. Public investment 
took place not only in the main basic infrastructure projects but also it began the development of 
production activities such as petroleum refining , steel , cellulose ,cement , textile even services 
such as tourism   and so on. 
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In the institutional level the government was aware about the importance of implementation of 
efficient institutional structures such as offices of agriculture’s development, organization for 
trade and distribution, state and mixed private\public owned companies, cooperative for 
production, services and consumers, transport companies and banks and top school such the 
national school of administration which formed the elite of civil servant.  
In the period of 1962-1971 per capita income increased by 2.3% per year in average and per 
capita consumption increased by 2.5 % also. The state sector embraced agriculture 90% in late 
1960.The growth rate over this period was 4.9% and this despite the fact that a good deal of 
investment was in the long-term projects such as infrastructure and human resources 
development , the investment rate reached 26.3% of GDP and capital stock grew by 11.5% on 
average per year . This growth was based on foreign capital accumulation. The current deficit 
reached 10% of GDP, the external debt ratio doubled between 1961 and 1967 and the debt 
services skyrocketed from 1.6% of export in 1961 to 26.1% in 1967 which led to difficulties in 
borrowing in the long term, the crisis began and aggravated with the cooperative movement and 
the big lobbying of landowners .This phase come to halt after the report of world bank showing 
the huge deficit of public enterprises especially hidden by ministry of finance and planning. 
2. The mixed economy period (1971-1986): 
 
 In the late 1960, Tunisia has changed its policy to encourage the development of the private 
sector by protecting it from foreign competition while continuing its policy orientation. 
The period of fifteen years which extends from 1970 to 1985 witness an entirely state-controlled 
economy and is characterized by two movements: a movement to promote the private sector with 
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a significant protections and a movement of strong involvement of the state through significant 
investment in the industry sector. GDP grew in average by 6.2% and per capita GDP by 3.7% 
between 1971 and 1981. The Tunisians investor continuous enjoys a tariffs protection throughout 
the period of 70-85; the law of 1972 which gave a special advantage to exporting firms was the 
main incentive to boost the industry sectors reinforced by another law in 1974 in order to 
stimulate investment in the poor regions. 
The main achievement of this policy was as following24: 
? The share in investment for the public sector decreased from 67% to 57%; 
? Industrial production capacity increased from 4.7% in 1974 to 25.6% in 1978. 
? The share of oil products in total export went from 25.8% in 1972 to 54% in 1981. 
? Agriculture grew significantly. 
In spite of encouragement to the private sector the government still controls the economic 
activity and investment. Most of the prices at different stage of production were fixed by a 
system of government decree and approval. The price policy first objective is to protect 
consumers particularly those with low income, and to assure to producer of key sectors prices 
that were sufficient to stimulate investment, production and labor hiring. Later on three other 
objectives were pursued: export promotion, inflation control, and the equilibrium of supply and 
demand. Soon a number of difficulties become apparent among which: 
? Restriction on the import of raw materials limited the growth of firms and lead to a 
market shrinking. 
?  There was excessive capital intensity and underutilization of production capacities. 
                                      
24  Tunisia’s path to development 1961-2001 ,sofiane ghali , shanghai may 2004 
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? Inflation increased the cost of production. 
? The complexities of administrative tasks become burdensome. 
? Tariffs and quotas leads to a level of protection even higher than the nominal level. 
The 1981 witness a change of government which come with a new strategy that pursue the 
populist style of governance justify by the increase of wages that had no  economic justification. 
This policy leads to non-competitive economic structures that had the following results: 
? In 1982-1986 , the yearly average rate of GDP growth were 3.6% and 1% for GDP per 
capita which decreased compared to previous record; 
? The investment rate was 30.2% in average which was the highest in the Tunisian 
experience of development; 
? Nominal wages increased by 12.9% and real wages by 2.7% on average during the same 
period ; 
? Total factors productivity growth was negative -1.7% and the productivity of capital 
declined by 4.3%; 
? Exports decreased by 0.8% in average each year and imports by 1.1%; 
? The large and inefficient public enterprises relied heavily on  public support and bank 
financing ; 
? A widespread system of price, investment, trade, and credit and exchange control 
substantially distorted consumption and investment decisions. 
In the mid-80's gross international reserves were revised downward. The unemployment rate has 
climbed to 15% and could continue to climb rapidly if there is no major change in government 
attitudes. Indeed the way of Tunisia’s progress was not always smooth. There were substantial 
fluctuations in real growth, from a high 17.7% in 1972 to a low of -1.5% in 1986 reflecting the 
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adoption of different economic policies and the impact of domestic and international business 
cycles on development.  
The new policy of development chosen in the early 70s, and which was implemented with 
varying degrees of continuity until the mid 80's, was more liberal because it advocated the 
reduction of state intervention, increased private sector role in the economy. In practice the 
private sector has grown, the public sector has retained its importance. The state continues to 
occupy a leading position thanks to the extension of public enterprise sector and the maintenance 
of leadership at all levels of economic activity. 
The Tunisian government reassessed its political strategy while acknowledging that the economy 
is paralyzed by major distortions and an excess of interventionism that has limited productivity 
and encourages inefficient imports and discourages savings in financial sector. 
Public sector accounts for all resources which hinders the contribution of the private sector to 
competition and job creation. 
The main economic problems before reform were: 
? A huge budget deficit of 5.2% of GDP in the period 81-86 with expenditures reaching 
40% of GDP in the year  85-86; 
? Non-oil revenue that constitutes 30% of GDP. 
?  Expansionary monetary policy maintained by the financial needs of the budget and 
public enterprises as well as real interest rates too , sometimes null, which contributes 
not only to demand of credit but also to some distortions in the allocation of credit and to 
a weakness financial system; 
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? Public sector inefficiency which heavily relied on government support and funding of 
banks;  
? Price systems, investment, trade, credit and the exchange control, distorted decisions on 
consumption and investment; 
? Rising external current account deficit which rose from 5% of GDP in 1980 up to 11% in 
1984 and then stabilized at 8% in 1985-86 reflecting the high level of collective demand 
and slowing exports and the overvaluation of the currency; 
? The rising level of external debt which amounts to 38% of GDP in 1981 to 63% in 1986 
and the solvency ratio has doubled from 14% of current jobs to 28% in 198625. 
To counter all these problems Tunisia has instituted since September 1986, a policy of 
Liberalization of the economy (imposed by IMF in order to adjust the whole economy and 
introduce a base for market economy). Indeed, following a severe economic and financial crisis, 
a structural adjustment plan, inspired by liberal, was adopted with the help of international 
financial bodies.26 
This plan has come to break with the economic policies pursued until then. Indeed various 
measures were taken to stabilize and liberalize the economy: 
? Liberalization and deregulation of imports and promotion of exports  
? New legislation to suppress various authorization of investment and hence suppression of 
protected markets 
? Fiscal reforms 
? Privatization and exit of state owned firms from competitive sectors 
                                      
25  IMF , December 1993 




? Legislation in favor of competition 
? Liberalization of the financial sector, the credit market and the capital market. 
Compared to previous economic choice, the SAPs is a real turning point in the economic policy 
of independent Tunisia insofar as it involves transforming an economy largely managed and 
protected in a market economy which will be largely open to the outside. 
The economic outlook in Tunisia for the period of the sixth plan (1982-86) and beyond raises 
several issues. Indeed Two main issues emerge: adaptation of the economy to the lower resource 
availability, and achievement of a maximum of new employment with the increasing financial 
and balance-of-payments constraints. The plan proposes to step up directly productive, labor 
intensive investments and to finance them through cutting investments in infrastructure and 
capital intensive industries and slowing down the growth of private consumption.27 Following 
the crisis of balance of payment Tunisia has launched a series of programs of economic 
stabilization and adjustment. reforms were intended to maintain a prudent macroeconomic 
framework, liberalizing prices and gradually remove controls on the domestic market and to 
reduce public sector intervention in the production of goods (to a lesser extent in terms of 
services).28 
Indeed, Tunisian authorities have later created a politically and socially stable framework much 
appreciated by foreign investors. The cornerstones of this framework include: legislation that 
favors the private sector, a series of simplified administrative procedures, and easy access to 
financing, training for economic operators... 
 
                                      
27  WB, report June2 9, 1983 
28  Country sheet , WB 2003 
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3. The social  indicators over the period of pre-adjustment: 
 
After the dependence the first Tunisia challenges was to improve living conditions in all level, so 
the government give special intention to social sectors such as health , education and social 
security  in order to alleviate poverty to its lowest level , in order to ensure that government 
heavily invested in education and health , the two successive decade of 1960 witness a 
tremendous increase in the level of education in fact the population having a primary education 
jumped to 14% in 1960 ,later the schooling of population aged between 6 and 24 was 37.4% in 
1975 and the rate of literacy was 45% in the same year. In the early 1960 the health sector lacks 
human resources 29but effort of state was great to ensure the basic needs of population. Life 
expectancy was 51 years in 1961 and infant mortality was 139 per thousand live births in 1966. 
The public expenditures in social program were 18.7% of GDP in late 1986. 
The rate of poverty was 25.9%in 1975 which was very high compared to the rate of poverty in 
2001 after SAPs.  
II. IMF conditionality: 
 
In order to receive structural adjustment loans, Tunisia had to agree to undergo structural 
adjustment programs, which were apparently designed to make the economy more efficient 
and better capable of sustained growth.  
? Removing restrictions on foreign investments in local industry, banks and other financial 
services. Thus, local industry or banks could not be protected against giant foreign 
intervention. 
                                      
29  See table in the annexes 
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? Cutting tariffs, quotas and other restrictions on imports. 
? Devaluing the local currency against hard currencies such as the US dollar in order to 
make exports still more competitive. 
? Privatizing state enterprises, thereby providing further access for foreign capital. 
? Reducing wages or wage increases to make exports more competitive. Radically 
reducing government spending, including spending on health, education and welfare 
combined with wage reduction would control inflation and ensure that all available 
money would be channeled into increasing production for export. 
?   Undertaking a deregulation program to free export oriented corporations from 
government controls that protect labor, the environment and natural resources, thereby 
cutting costs and further increasing export competitiveness. 
? Reorienting the economy toward exports in order to earn the foreign exchange required 
for servicing the debt and to become correspondingly more dependent on the global 
economy.  
The IMF demands high interest rates, high exchange rates and budgetary strictness, i.e. reducing 
spending on food subsidies, education, public health and other social services.  
The IMF proposed tight prescriptions which can be summarized as liberalization, privatization, 




                                      
30  Stiglitz believes which he call  “market fundamentalists” 
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III. Implementation of SAPs &Liberalization of Tunisian economy : 
 
Just after the implementation of SAPs the economy begins to be broadly open and foreign direct 
investment was widely encouraged31, primarily due to the accession to the G.A.T.T agreement 
and, thereafter, due to the sign up of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO). Tunisia then sign with 
the European Union an agreement, which came into force on March 1, 1998, for the creation of a 
free trade area by the end of the year 2010.  
The table below shows the different agreement of Tunisian government with tiers. 
1. AGREEMENTS  
Country or number of 
countries 
nature of the agreement 
 
Date 
1. W.T.O  accession to G.A.T.T 
 
2.European union free trade area 
 
July 1995 
3.20 countries (Africa, 
middle east, America…) 




4.39 countries Investment Guarantee 
Agreements 
 
accession to MIGA 
5.35 countries (Europe, US, 
Asia , Africa..) 




                                      
31  IMF report 2004 
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 This “European linking for Tunisia" requires it to adapt its economy to the requirements of 
European standards. The efforts undertaken by the government since the adoption of SAP, to 
liberalize the economy was important. It was conducted in a stepwise manner, which helped to 
avoid major economic and social shocks. 
I will try to give a whole picture about the liberalization effort of the economy, this liberalization 
which covers almost all the economic sectors (tax system, public finance, job flexibility) I will 
focus on three aspects: the deregulation, tax reform and privatization. 
A. Deregulation: 
 
Deregulation is now a quasi-universal phenomenon. Indeed, no country, eager to enter into the 
world economy, can sustainably maintain regulatory provisions that deviates the developments 
recorded in a majority of partners or economic competition. Today, governments are obliged to 
adopt measures of convergence with the foreign legal and tax practices. Tunisia is not an 
exception to this phenomenon. Indeed, governments have adhered to a policy of deregulation. 
However, its scope and pace of implementation remain registered by the country's specific 
economic context, that is to say an economy that aspires to become developed which still lies on 
a number of imbalances. 
In this respect, the deregulation policy adopted by the Tunisian authorities is neither general nor 
absolute. It does not affect all sectors of the economy and, in case it exists, it is not always the 
30 
 
same intensity32. Deregulation also did not in all cases accompanied by a decrease in regulation. 
It’s the content of this regulation that change. Today regulation is more liberal. 
The study of deregulation itself is not always simple because of uncertainty of the definition of 
the term33. In this study deregulation means the policies which tend to change regulation against 
free entrepreneurship and loosening the constraints that weigh on economic operators. 
1. The questioning of the rules against free entrepreneurship: 
Deregulation in this field led to assertion of two principles; freedom of investment and freedom 
of establishment. 
Before 1986 investment was subjected, especially in the field of industry and agreement 
activities. Since this date, some particular texts affirm freedom of investment. This freedom was 
confirmed and strengthened to some sector by the code of investment incentives34.The latter 
distinguishes between the act of investing and profit incentive granted by public authorities, the 
code mention that the listed sector are subject to statement not to authorization, also this 
concerned nationals and foreigners, resident and not resident in some limits (appropriation of 
land for agriculture projects is not allowed for foreigners). 
It’s to know if the practice of economic activities needs an authorization of public authority or 
not. Deregulation in this field is not generalized. It touch only specific sector like the distributive 
trade sector and subject to Article 3 of the act of Trade of distribution35 which provides that 
                                      
32  Law n85 -108 of 6december 1985, jort 1985 n 87 , p 1626 and law n92-81 of 3 august 1992 n 52 ,p 1005. 
33  J.chevalier ,” les enjeux de la deregulation” 1987, p 281  
34  Law n 93-120 of 27 December 1993, J.O.R.T 1994 n 11  
35  Law n 91-44 of first July 1991, J.O.R.T, 1991, N 49, p 1263  
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“exercise of the activity of trade of distribution... is free and is not subject to prior authorization 
“ . However, changing this law in 199436 to alleviate the principle of freedom, adding that 
"certain, specific, business activities which their list shall be fixed by decree, however, may be 
regulated in accordance with specifications approved by decree of the Minister of Trade.”37 
It is not enough that the contractor is free to invest or settle. It is necessary also that he does not 
meet the constraints in the exercise of his activity. This second aspect of deregulation has also 
been supported by the Tunisian authorities. 
2. Loosening the constraint on economic operators: 
 
It is about the simplification of rules and procedures and streamlining of rules in certain sectors 
which include legislation that favors the private sector, a series of simplified administrative 
procedures, easy access to financing, training for economic operators,.. 
Since the implementation of SAPs, Tunisia launched an important reform project that focuses on 
economic development and administrative reform. This last issue in particular is an 




                                      
36  Law n 94-38 of 24 February 1994, J.O.R.T, 1994 n 17, p 366  
37  Foreigners should qualified for decree law of 30 august 1961  
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i. Simplification of rules and procedures: 
 
In the context of administrative reform and as part of the upgrading of the administration38 
(1996) an effort was made to simplify administrative procedures. Firstly the “Guichet unique 
“has been created to fulfill the formalities required for the operation of investment and after that 
to unify the formalities of enterprises creation which has been promoted. 
In parallel there has been simplification of rules for carrying out foreign trade operations. The 
Tunisian authorities are well aware of the country’s economic challenges and would like to boost 
the reforms in all levels in order to encourage local private investment and FDIs. 
During the 1990’s, the pace of administrative reform increased significantly as Tunisia focuses 
on strengthening the bases of a modern administration that fulfils its duties competently and 
efficiently while establishing a trust-based relationship with the citizenry. 
This process quickened in the late 1990’s with the 9th Development Plan, those implementation 
coincided with the renewal of the administrative programs adopted by the various departments. 
The 9th Development Plan entailed numerous administrative sectors and activities, including 
structural re-organization and better definition of responsibilities, modernization in the ICT 
sector, and a clearer division of roles between regional and central administrations and between 
the latter and the private sector. Within the public administration renewal framework, the 
following actions have been taken: reduction of authorizations (60% of which have either been 
                                      
38  Decree n 96-49 of 16 January 1996  
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substitute by the so-called “cahiers de charges” or abolished altogether); identification of a single 
interlocutor for investors who want to set up individual projects; creation of a quality system 
based on international ISO 9000 norms for several pilot projects in light of a future wide-scale 
implementation of such norms; creation of a regional administrative mediator to conciliate 
problems that can happen within administration. 
Also, the government proceeded with the installation of a High Council of ordering of the laws 
and regulations in force39. The task of this council is to oversee the collection of matter by 
legislative provisions and the provisions of decrees and regulations in force to proceed to their 
ordering, with no resulting changes in their background. 
This concern for improvement, relief and clarification of the law is important but must be 
accompanied by greater stability of legal rules, because what we see today is a frequent change 
of adopted texts. Stability and legal security are a necessary part of economic activity. 
ii. The easing of rules in certain sectors: 
The easing of rules has touched unequally a number of sectors and in a progressive manner. We 
can list the following; 
? Prices and competition: 
 
Till 1991, the administrations intervene in broad measures to fix prices. Law of 29 July 1991 
reverses the tendency and establishes the principle of free pricing.40 
                                      
39  Decree n 96-48 of 15 January 1996, J.O.R.T 1996,N: 7 , P 205  
40  Law n 91-64 of 29 July 1991, J.O.R.T 1991,n 55, p 1393 
34 
 
Indeed, Article 2 of the Act provides that "the prices of goods, products and services are freely 
determined by the competition." However, Article 3 of this Law excluded from that freedom, the 
products, goods and essential services in the sectors where there is no competition. At the same 
time, this law regulates the competition for prohibition of anti-competitive practices by creating a 
Competition Commission to sanction41. 
? Credit : 
 
Deregulation is also intervened in the matters of credit and more particularly in the fixing of 
interest rates42. Indeed, each bank is now free to fix the interest rate applicable to deposit 
accounts, certificates of deposit and to any financial product in dinars. It is also free to fix the 
rate applicable to credit balances. Finally the bank is free to set the interest rates applicable to 
other forms of funding irrespective of their shape and duration. 
? Exchange:  
 
The law of 3 may 199343 which proceed to a partial deregulation in the exchange issue. The first 
article of the law liberalized transfers for payments sent abroad under current operations and the 
transfer of net real products of the sale or liquidation of capital invested by importation of 
foreign currencies. In the same logic resident exporters companies can finance the open of their 
                                      
41  become the Competition Council after modification of the law of july 29 ,1991 by law n 95-42 
of abril 1995 , J.O.R.T 1995, N35 , P 976. 
42  Circular of the Central Bank n91-22 of December 17, 1991  
43  Law n 93-48 of may 3,1993, amending the Exchange Code  and Foreign Trade, J.O.R.T 1993 
n 35 , p 627 
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office or agencies abroad44. Moreover, during the year 1994, a market of exchange has been 
created. However, this market is only open to local banks. 
The development of this market is to ensure the determination of the real value of the dinar and 
increase the current convertibility of the currency, pending its full convertibility45. 
? Financial market: 
 
The financial market was also reorganized46. In this field reform has essentially consists in 
transforming the status of the stock exchange market from a public institution with industrial and 
commercial aspect, to became a limited company whose capital is exclusively endorsed by the 
brokers, whose last was obliged by law to create an Inter-professional Company Depository 
Clearing and settlement of securities. Finally, a regulatory body of the stock market has emerged: 
it is the council's financial market. 
? Foreign trade: 
 
Long time subject to approvals, foreign trade was liberalized. In this field freedom has become 
the rule and authorization the exception. Indeed articles 2 of the relative law of foreign trade47 
mention that “importation and exportation of products are free with the exception of the products 
subject to the restrictions prescribed by law”. 
                                      
44  Decree 93-1696 of august 16 ,1993 and notice of change of minister of finance amending notice of 
change n 4-93, J.O.R.T 1997 N 64, P 1492  
45  Circular of the Central Bank n97-07 of may 9 , 1997 
46  Law n 94-117 of 14 November 1994, J.O.R.T , 1994, n90 p 1850  
47  Law n 94-41 of mars 7 1994, J.O.R.T 1994,n 19, p 403  
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Next to deregulation and easiness of business and companies’ creation a tax reform also was 
installed in order to master inflation. 
B. Tax reform 
 
The IMF model for adjustment mention that tax reform is one of the pillars to achieve adjustment, 
indeed Tunisian authority was wise about importance of tax reform to widen the taxable amount 
in order to ensure the increase of public expenditure and to ensure a noninflationary financing of 
public expenditure. The most important thing implemented by the tax reform was the institution 
of the value added tax (VAT), which allowed an adjustment of public finance, a re-establishment 
of the external accounts and a significant retreat of inflation. Moreover, thanks to additional tax 
related to operations of privatization, the public deficit was brought back from 2.3% of GDP in 
1999 to 1.6% of GDP into 2000. Inflation and deficit were contained during the first eight 
months of year 2003 within the limits of 2% and 1.5% respectively.  
These operations seems successful in term of adjustment and structural change , this can be in 
harmony with  McKinnon and Shaw  who propose the adoption of tax reforms for financing 
the public deficit and Controlling inflation by the reduction in the inflationary financing . 
The Tax reform is obviously a major mechanism met in place to ensure the successful transition 
from a Tunisian regulated economy to a market economy. Taxation is the process by which 
governments ensure the funds collected through mandatory to pay for government spending, an 
important means of State intervention in economic and social development. In this regard, tax 
reform aims to: 
? Redistribution as fairly as possible the tax burden; 
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? stimulation of production; 
? The balance of public finances; 
? Lower tax rates; 
? Broadening the tax base; 
? Improved efficiency of the tax system; 
? Reorganization of recovery procedures. 
The tax reform requires a transitional period48, which explains its gradual implementation, while 
seeking the maximum efficiency and equity. It was articulated around four main areas: 
       1.The imposition of value added tax (VAT) in lieu of taxes on turnover (TP, TC and 
TPS) and the arrangements of other indirect taxes; 
       2.The institution of the single tax on personal income taxes in lieu of tax and scheduler 
general overlay (CIP) and the fitting of the taxation of distributed profits and income from 
movable capital; 
      3. The adjustment of tariffs; 
      4. Strengthening the fiscal resources of local government bodies. 
1. The value added tax: 
 
The VAT system replaced an indirect tax is characterized by multiple rates tax revenues (45 rates 
with 23 specific rates and 22 ad-valorem) to give birth to a single tax, general and differential 
rates (6%, 17% and 29% in 1988) ,few years after changing these rates become: 6%, 10%, 18% 
and 29%). 
                                      
48  The government began in a first step, by introducing a new system of indirect taxation in 1988 to replace the old tax on transactions 
by value added tax (VAT). The second step is to introduce a single tax on personal income physical and corporation tax instead of many taxes 
under the old system. The third step is to target the reform of registration fees and stamp duty and review of all exemptions and tax benefits for 
investments. The next step is to continue to introduce reforms in the tax system in the sense of having greater transparency and harmonization 
between different modes of taxation and especially to replace the tax valuation due to the dismantling of tariffs following the introduction of a 
free trade area between Tunisia and the European Union.  
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The scope of the VAT covers all economic activities except agriculture and fisheries for which 
the quality of the taxable remains optional. Thus, "are subject to VAT, whatever the purpose or 
results, the business is done in Tunisia within the meaning of Article 3 and coating the industrial, 
commercial, or belonging to a profession and business transactions other than sales49 .The 
exemptions provided by tax Legislations are taken for various reasons: economic, social and 
administrative sometimes. 
2. Evolution of indirect tax: 
 
Since 1988 (introduction of VAT), excise taxes have a slight downward trend due to a radical 
change in the organizing system of indirect taxation. Indeed, these taxes accounted in 1988, 
nearly 81% of total tax revenue, but only 73.8% in 1995 and above 69.2% in 1997. The graph 
below illustrates very clearly a tendency to the decline in indirect taxes, resulting in a tax 
valuation. 
Despite this general trend of decline in the share of indirect tax in total tax revenue, the burden of 
these taxes is highly important in the tax structure of Tunisia (on average this share is around 
75%). 
 
 1. Growth of indirect taxes 
 
                                      
49  Article 1 of the Act of June 2, 1988. 
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3. Custom duties: 
The tariff policy implementation until 1986 resulted in an increase in the average tariff, 
following successive increases in tariffs (the highest of which is equivalent to 231%, and the 
lowest 15%, to allow the exclusion of capital goods that do not have similar manufactured in 
Tunisia (graph set: average tariff).50  
The development of tariffs began with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program 
(1987), in order to improve the competitiveness of domestic production by acting on the 
reduction of the effective protection of domestic market. 
The decrease in customs revenues is also due to requirements imposed by the entry for Tunisia in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and especially by establishing a free trade agreement 
between Tunisia and the European Union (EU). Indeed, the WTO has required each member 
state to reduce its effective protection of domestic market in order to stimulate international trade. 
In this context, Tunisia presented at admission (1993) containing an agreement on the 
commitments to be followed to gradually reduce its tariff rates. 
In addition, the Free Trade Area (FTA) requires the elimination by 2007 of all tariffs on 
industrial sector. In this sense, nearly 60% of Tunisian imports come of the EU, which confirm 
the importance of the depreciation tax generated by the FTA, estimated at 700 MTD dismantling 
after the planned customs duties. The evolution of customs revenue recorded a rising trend until 
1995 (the date of the creation of an FTA between Tunisia and EU). Tariffs have provided 32.3 
MTD in 1976; 
346.8 MTD in 1986; 399 MTD in 1988; 660 MTD in 1992 and reached a record 772.9 in 1995. 
From 1995, customs revenues have suffered a remarkable decline by recording 741 MTD in 
                                      
50  The average tariff t = CR/ M, with CR : customs revenue (net of tax exemptions) 
and M: imports  
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1996 and only 704.3 MTD in 1997. Revenues in 1998 are equivalent only to 679 MD51. 
The tax reform in general witness an increase of direct tax (Fig 2) and a decrease of indirect tax 
which increase the tax burden on citizens and favor export and competitiveness of economy. 
This reform was also followed by the establishment of FTZ (free trade zone) with EU. 
 
2. Growth of direct taxes  
 
2. GORWTH OF DIRECT TAXES  
4. The establishment of compensation measures 
In an attempt to offset the tax shortfall caused by the dismantling of tariffs, two types of 
measures can be used (also used to reduce the budget deficit): 
? Measures aimed at reducing government current expenditure or investment and (demand 
action); 
? Measures based on the manipulation of Taxation (supply action). 
The reduction of public spending is becoming under the influence of international institutions 
(IMF and World Bank) an economic sound measure which is why in our view the extensive use 
                                      
51  Source : national institute of statistics 
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of this measure, particularly by developing countries where the role of the state is still powerful. 
The reduction of public spending is done by acting either on current expenditure or on capital 
expenditure. The first is a short-term action that remains difficult to be applied in developing 
countries for social reasons and in particular policies (Hicks and Kubiscli, 1984). 
The second is a long-term action (most used), it is to reduce capital expenditures (for example 
infrastructure spending). This measure is less political risk, but it has adverse consequences on 
the economy. 
The action of the tax (increase in tax rates) on supply aims to stimulate domestic production 
through more efficient use of production factors. In this regard, the role of taxation is through 
manipulation of tax rates, reduce price distortions. This measure aims therefore to stimulate, 
long-term production growth rate and increased investment, but at the expense of consumer 
goods. 
Authorities have chosen as a primary measure to offset the tax valuation due to tariff reduction, 
higher rates of indirect taxation. The main actions are: 
? A revision to the successive increase in excise duties related to goods subject to customs 
duties and will undergo tariff dismantling. The use of human consumption as a surrogate 
measure began in 1988 with the introduction of VAT and is to offset the tax shortfall due 
to the transition from a TCA to a VAT regime. This attempt alternative was reinforced in 
1995 (creation of the FTA), where human consumption will replace customs duties on 
the tariff dismantling. 
?  A charge on customs services was introduced at a rate of 1.5% of the amount of duty 
and customs charges. The amount of this fee has doubled between 1988 and 1993 from 
12.7 to 25 MTD. And also from 1991, two customs duties were established on an interim 
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basis that are the countervailing duty (DCP) at a rate of 10% to 30% and the inflation 
levy to importation (ICP) at 5% the amount of duties and taxes on import. The amount 
of DCP and ICP has almost doubled between 1991 and 1993, passing from 37,5 to 66 
MTD. 
Financially, the compensation measures are widely considered successes. 
Economically, some compensatory measures are harmful, including higher rates of VAT on 
goods and services produced locally. In our opinion, this policy is dangerous insofar as it would 
in fact grant a bonus to imported products and to penalize local production.  
Already under great pressure by the liberalization of imports, the rise of prices, driven by the 
increase in VAT will therefore cause a decline in investment, production and employment, and 
therefore a shrinking tax base as well as direct taxes (taxes on income of natural persons and 
legal persons) that indirect taxes (VAT, human consumption).  
Governments and in order to increase tax inflows have forgotten or have ignored the fact that the 
manipulation of the rate of taxation is limited because a heavier taxation may have a negative 
effect on the behavior of economic agents and therefore on economic activity. 
However, the increase of VAT has a beneficial effect on businesses using a high content of 
imported inputs and which they will export their production. It would result in lower prices 




                                      
52  See Rutherford and Tarr Rustroin, 1993. 
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5. Tax burden 
The overall tax burden in Tunisia is kept constant during the period 1988-1997. It is around 20% 
(net of transfers). Similarly, during the period 1961-1987, the tax burden is equal to 20% plus at 
least two points. It seems therefore that the tax burden is still bearable in Tunisia. Chart shows an 
oscillation around 20% of the overall tax burden. It also indicates that after the tax reform 
(indirect, direct 1988 and 1989), the tax burden is reduced by Compared with the period pre-
reform. 
 
3. Taxes burden 
Next to the deregulation, Tax reform, Liberalization of Tunisian economy was made by the way 
of Privatization. 
C. Privatization ( APPENDICE 1):  
In order to boost the country’s economy and to establish a sustained growth, privatization in 
Tunisia has been part of the macroeconomic policy since the late 1980s and has been pursued 
without interruption since then. In 1987, Tunisia introduced a series of reforms towards 
becoming a market-based economy. The privatization program was launched in 1989. Tunisia's 
privatization program is being implemented through the transfer of assets, the sale of shares, 
public tenders and concessions. Foreign investment has contributed to 67 % of the transfers. The 
privatization program offers wide opportunities for foreign investors in a variety of sectors, 
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especially those related to improvements in infrastructure. Completion of the privatization 
program is expected in 2001 but it continues till now with a new vision (2010)53.the following 
table provide a general view of privatization within the development plans. 
 Development Plan 
7th  8th  9th  
87-91 92-96 97-2001 
Proceeds(MDT) 126 190 1139 
The number of enterprises 
concerned 
37 44 75 
Number of operations realized 68 83 170 
 3. General view of privatization, Source: privatization web site www.privatisation.gov.tn 
The table emphasize that the most increase in scope of privatization operations was in the 9th  
plan 1997 to 2001 which explain clearly that the first period was reserved to stabilization and the 
openness come later in the second decade. 
1. concept and goals of privatization: 
 
In Tunisia the concept of privatization is integrated in the framework of complementarities 
between public and private sector and in result, it contributes to the concretization of 
disengagement of state from competitive activities. 
It’s based on this approach that governments have made it one of the axes of liberalization and 
development of private sector and an important instrument for enhancing the effectiveness of 
economy, and consolidation of its opening on exterior and the rehabilitation of market 
                                      
53  See web site of privatization in Tunisia; www.privatisation.gov.tn 
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mechanisms. More concretely, the Privatization is defined as the transfer from public to private 
sector ownership control or management of a company producing a good or service. It can also 
take the form of an opening to private sectors and / or activities traditionally reserved for the 
public sector. 
More accurately and more clearly, the Privatization in Tunisia has a double meaning in the 
process of economic development; privatization of some activities traditionally reserved to 
public sector and privatization of some state owned enterprises. 
i. Privatization of activities traditionally reserved to public sector: 
 
First launched in 1987, the privatization program has since consistently offered noteworthy 
opportunities for attracting the interest of foreign investors, including many operations for the 
sale of assets or stock in the capital of semi-public enterprises, as well as concessions to build 
highways, produce electricity, desalinate water, treat wastewater and solid waste, ...This policy 
aims to involve private sector in economic fields traditionally controlled by the public sector.  
This choice is in the framework of redistribution of role between public and private sector. In 
this vision the 8th  plan of development provided “the possibility to carry out certain public 
functions by private sector”54 in this spirit, the Government plans to entrust to private national 
developers (entrepreneurs) or foreigners, the construction and operation of a number of 
infrastructure projects like highways and power plants in the form of built operate transfer 
(B.O.T)55. Appeal of the government to the use of this kind of policy is not a mode but because it 
                                      
54  8th  plan of economic development(1992-1996) , general report , p 56  
55  BOT means that the client has a right to own the facility, while the third-party vendor builds the 
facility, hires the employees, and gets the operation running for a certain period of time (usually a period 
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entail some benefits. Indeed the appeal to private sector to build and operating some public 
infrastructure projects first allows developing new infrastructure without raising taxes, budget 
deficits and public debt; this advantage is not negligible when one considers that the state budget 
resources are limited and not extensible but will instead fall due to lower customs receipts under 
the agreements of G.A.T.T (W.T.O) and the free area with European union which enter in 
practice from 2008. Also the exploitation of these activities by private sector can entail 
productivity and knowhow of the private companies and benefits that can enhance 
competitiveness, the only question is about the capacity of Tunisians users (citizens) to pay the 
tariffs fixed by the private sector. 
ii. Privatization of public sector enterprises: 
 
The privatization policy adopted in Tunisia, has a number of objectives that are not specific in 
their majority to our country. These include providing new resources to the budget of the state, 
reduce the burden of subsidies to public enterprises, to reactivate the financial market, to 
contribute to the mobilization of domestic savings, to develop public ownership and improved 
performance of privatized companies. Governments also have to be financed with money from 
privatizations the Regional Development. 
In 1989, with the promulgation of Law 89-9, this set the general framework for public enterprise 
restructuring and privatization. Approximately 45 companies, with an estimated total worth of 
about $90 million, were privatized in the early phase of the program. Roughly half of these 
companies were hotels; others were in the textile, construction material and agri-business sectors. 
                                                                                                                           
of 3-5 years) and hand over the operations to the client after the said period. During the contract period, 
the vendor and the client work closely with a senior client representative monitoring the operations. At 
the time of the transition, the vendor is suitably compensated.  
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Most of the enterprises privatized in these early phases of the program had been unprofitable 
and/or relatively small and they were sold directly to private parties rather than to the public via 
the Tunis stock exchange. Some were simply liquidated and their assets sold to private buyers.  
The Government then launched a second phase of privatization, targeting for the first time public 
enterprises that were typically larger and profitable. The first significant profitable state-owned 
company sold was “Industries Chimiques du Fluor” (ICF) in February, 1993. Forty percent of the 
shares were sold in a block to a major shareholder who took over management of the company, 
and the remaining shares were offered to the public with no more than 500 shares sold to any 
single shareholder (to prevent a blocking minority). After the sale of ICF, the privatization of 
companies basically stalled until late 1994. Then 20 percent of “Ateliers mecaniques du Sahel” 
(AMS), Tunisia's leading producer of stainless steel kitchen utensils and flatware, was sold 
through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the stock exchange for a value of $1.5 million. Also 
in 1994, Law 94-102 was passed. It allows the government to sell blocks of shares through a 
tender process on the stock exchange, and to create a "golden share” for particularly sensitive 
privatization operations. Other achievements in 1994 were limited mainly to a number of 
preparatory studies of several privatization candidate companies and of specific sectors of the 
economy (e.g., cement, mineral water, and energy generation).  
As far as macroeconomic policy is concerned, the Tunisian state appears to have resolved to 
disengage itself from a near totality of economic activities. Such an initiative forms part of a 
development strategy to build better economic structures and to redeploy the productive 
apparatus in such a way that will enhance its competitiveness by international standards. The 
48 
 
state still retains final control over the privatization program, on account of the sensitive nature 
of the sectors in which privatizing companies operates. 
Ultimately the privatization was aimed primarily the following points: 
? Ensure the sustainability of enterprises by improving the efficiency and competitiveness 
of concerned enterprises, while ensuring the mobilization of capital, the flexibility of 
management and technology transfer necessary for their development 
? Consolidate the balance of public finances by reducing spending supported by the 
budget of the state under certain public enterprises and by providing additional resources 
to support the effort of the state particularly in the fields of Education, training, health 
and infrastructure... 
? Support the efforts of the state in providing some services traditionally provided by 
public sector. 
? Boost the capital market and develop the public shareholding by the realization of public 
offerings and the introduction of some privatized companies to the Stock Exchange. 
2. Characteristics and principles of privatization: 
i. Characteristics of privatization program: 
Evaluation of privatization program since its beginning in 1987, allow us to come up with double 
mutation on the quantitative and qualitative level. 
Firstly in the quantitative level the results of privatization that finished in 1997 were 93 
enterprises with total assets of 400 million dinars (Tunisian currency). Sector of transport and 
tourism are the first concerned in this phase of privatization. Then has the benefit of advances in 
economic reforms and the establishment of an appropriate legal and institutional framework 
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including through the enrichment of terms and techniques used in this field, the program has 
accelerated since 1995. Indeed, with the promulgation of the law of August 1994, transactions of 
privatization by sale of control blocks of shares on the basis of a specification have developed. 
Well, it was made 45 operation during the privatization period 1995-1997 which represents an 
annual average of 15 companies against 6 between 1987and 1994 , again this means that the first 
step of SAPs was the stabilization which spread from 87 till 94. 
ii.  Basic principles of privatization: 
 
The conduct of operations of privatizations obeys two fundamental principles: 
The first principle concerns the preservation of general interest; the privatization is not limited in 
effect to a simple transfer of ownership from public to private sector. Motivations in this regard 
are many and exceeding the sole sake of getting the maximum price56. The State is concerned 
first and foremost the sustainability of the company in question; It also gives particular 
importance to the preservation of the greatest number of jobs that is consistent with the criteria of 
efficiency and profitability of the company, the interest of the state also bears on the market 
situation in which the company operates to ensure the smooth functioning of market mechanisms 
and avoid monopoly situations. 
The second principle relates to the transparency of the privatization process. Indeed, the 
regulations in force that regulate privatization issues embody the following principles: 
? The Competition Appeal; 
? Advertising, mainly through the tendering; 
                                      
56  National survey about privatized enterprises and productive units, prime ministry of Tunisia 
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? The assessment conducted by professionals from outside the administration. 
The procedures for assessment of tenders they investigate through an inter-departmental 
decentralized process, with contributions from stakeholders outside the administration to 
consequently ensure full transparency. So all stakeholders are directly involved in the decision 
making process. 
D. Evaluation and financing of privatization program: 
1. Evaluation methods: 
Evaluation before any privatization is according to international norms and standards by 
professionals from outside the administration (Tunisian or foreign accounting firms) It should be 
noted in this context that, since 1997 the Ministry of Economic Development has adopted a new 
approach that aims to use the world famous banking institutions whenever privatization is 
complex and large scale as in the case of cement. 
The choice of organizations that will make the evaluation is performed on the basis of an appeal 
to the competition. 
2. Financing of the program: 
In order to stimulate the privatization process, arrangements have been made to facilitate the 
financing of privatization. 
Indeed, a circular of the Central Bank of Tunisia dated 23 November 1997, allows interested 
banks to grant directly, a medium term loans to finance the purchase of a block of control or an 
asset in the context of privatization operations. The second measure is to encourage investment 
companies with venture capital to participate in the privatization operations. 
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For this purpose, lines of credit contracted by Tunisia from the European investment bank have 
been put at the disposal of these companies to support the privatization program. 
3. Privatization and foreign investment: 
In Tunisia, foreign investment enjoys a special attention from the government, is reflected in the 
diverse actions and measures taken in this area. 
Tunisia is indeed gather all the favorable conditions for the mobilization of this type of 
investment with the aim to further consolidate the assets available to the country, first and 
foremost being the political and social stability. 
In this respect, privatization is an important vehicle to boost foreign investment; some 
privatizations are regarded as an additional attraction of this category of investment that 
contributes mainly to the transfer of technology and development of export. 
The privatization program offers extensive opportunities that may arouse the advantage of 
foreign investors. These opportunities relate to construction projects for highways, power 
generation, water desalination and water uses treatment … 
Results in this side are good, indeed, at the end of 1997 and over the total program of 
privatization, more than ten enterprises representing 20% of the value of privatized companies 
(80 million of dollars) are taken by foreign investment(see table 4). The chart below shows the 
part taken by foreign holders in the operations of privatizations till 2000 and the table below 
show the amount of foreign assets in privatization investments. 
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 4. Share of foreign investment in privatization receipts till 31-03-2000 source: central bank  
Sector of activity  Amount of foreign investment 
(in MDT) 
In % of total 
Agriculture and fisheries  - - 
Industry  811 15.6  
Agro-foods Industries - 
Construction materials, 800 
Ceramics and Glass industries  
Mechanical and electrical 
Industries   
Chemical Industries  
Leather and textiles Industries  















Services 4370 84.4 


















Total  5181 100.0 
4. Part of foreign investments in revenues from privatizations and restructurings, broken down 
by sector of activity, source privatization web site www.privatisation.gov.tn 
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4. New era of privatization: 
On the light of achieved results and with respect to requirements of the next stage especially in 
matters of leveling and openness of the economy, Privatization Program began a new phase 
characterized by the implementation of new provisions to accelerate the pace of operations, 
providing more flexibility in terms of procedures and techniques to strengthen publicity on 
companies to be privatized. In a context of liberalization the program of privatization after 1997 
witness a diversification of operations and widening the scope of its program to many 
competitive activities especially those that can entail high value added. 
The operations of privatization is more and more processed through the Tunisian stock exchange 
in order to create a dynamic in it and enhance its performance and ensure a public awareness of 
its importance.  
The tables below assess the privatization operations till 2000: 
period 1987-91 1992-94 1995-99 Total 
1987-2000 
Amount (MD) 131 64 1073 1268 
Number of 
enterprises 
38 10 90 138 
Number of 
operations 
65 35 192 292 











Number of operation 
tourism and crafts 
 
153 29 61 
transportation 72 18 35 
chemical and 
mechanical 
65 24 26 
 




57 18 56 
building materials 
 
766 17 31 
Textile 
 
13 5 9 
others 30 9 35 
Total 1268 138 292 
6. PRIVATISATION BY SECTORS 
Privatization was made by different manners as mentioned in the table below: 
Sector privatization by way of assignment from 1987-2000 
 
Concession 77 












7. PRIVATISATION MANNERS 
There is also a partly repaired business as mentioned in the table below: 
Repaired business 
 








Agriculture, fisheries and agro-food 
 
18 







8. REPAIRED BUSINESS 
Source of tables: privatization web site 
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E. Economic and financial policies:  
 
While the first step was the stabilization of macroeconomic variable and balance of payment 
trouble during the decade 1986-199657, the ninth plan(1997-2001) concentrate on structural 
change of the economy and its competitiveness and rational allocation of resources by promoting 
the private sector and opening the economy to foreign investors through encouraging the inflows 
of capitals and FDIs( Annex 4). In this framework a vast program has been implemented, 
consisting essentially on leveling of the whole economy. 
In consequences efforts has focused on strengthening the effectiveness of measures and reforms 
and increased their pace in different areas, mainly through the further opening of economy to the 
outside and adjustment of pricing policy, foreign trade and settlement; further consolidation of 
fiscal reform, the continuing reform of the financial system and the acceleration of privatization 
programs. 
Within this framework and to ensure the improvement of competitiveness of the Tunisian 
economy and the strengthening of its openness and integration into the global economy, Tunisia 
has carried out the implementation of a second operation of structural adjustment, supported by 
the World Bank and IMF with support of EU in the ninth plan. 
The reform program implemented under this operation covers areas as diverse as foreign trade, 
taxation, the state withdrawal, deregulation and facilitation of trade (shipping and ports, 
telecommunication, legal framework) and the work market. 
 
                                      
57  See Appendices 
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1. The further opening of the Tunisian economy and export promotion 
 
The foreign trade policy has been marked during the 9th plan by implementing the Association 
Agreement with the European Union which provides the establishment of a free trade area and 
intensification of economic relations between the two parties. 
It should be noted in this context that 1996 saw the implementation of the anticipated program of 
dismantling of tariff and that, in order to reduce costs and increase production, by the same the 
competitiveness of Tunisian products.  
Concomitantly, the accession of Tunisia to the World Trade Organization (WTO), resulting in 
new commitments that concern agriculture and which shall include the conversion of all non-
tariff measures into tariff equivalents and the reduction, over several years, subsidies and tariffs.  
These commitments involve, also, the elimination of remaining quantitative restrictions and 
improve conditions for competition and the revision of anti-dumping system and procedures 
relating to foreign trade. 
Emphasis has been placed on the harmonization of tariffs applied to imports from countries other 
than the European Union, as measured and the progress of tariff dismantling program to avoid 
the risk of diversion trade flows. This action was accompanied by the revision of customs code 
in order to adapt to the requirements of simplification of foreign trade. 
In parallel, efforts have been made to boost business cooperation with brotherly and friendly 
countries, especially those of the Maghreb and the Arab world. 
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Special attention has been paid to export because of its role in realizing the objectives of the 9th 
plan. That in this context was the establishment of the Council of export, under the aegis of the 
President of the republic,58 whose role includes the elaboration of strategies for export. 
2. Adaptation of pricing policies, competition, inside trade and compensation 
 
With the previous achievement in deregulation and improvement of environments of 
competitiveness and liberalization, the period after 1996, requires the intensification of efforts to 
consolidate the gains registered in this area and improve competitiveness as a prerequisite to 
enable the development process especially after signing the Association Agreement with the E U. 
The pricing, competition, inside trade and compensation recommended for the 9th  Plan have 
been contributed to the attainment of objectives in the next step through a better control of costs 
of production and quality improvement to ensure the upgrading of Tunisian enterprises, enhance 
their competitiveness and enable the full integration of the economy in the global sphere.  The 
action in this area is the best organization of distribution channels because of their important role 
in the development of productive sectors. 
In the context of liberalization of prices and the economy in a general way, the effort has been 
intensified to ensure consumer protection, to further improve the competitiveness and promote 
quality.  
Regarding compensation, and while maintaining the subsidy of basic consumer products destined 
for needy families benefit from this initiative, solutions and appropriate measures have been 
considered, she designed the targeting of compensating products, direct compensation each 
whenever possible and the generalization of the package.  
                                      
58  Speech of the president of the republic  Le Bardo, 28 décembre 1996 
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The objective is to improve the effectiveness of the compensation and to reduce the expenses of 
clearing at a level smaller or equal to 1% of GDP by 2001. 
3. Strengthening of fiscal reform and consolidation of different tax regimes 
 
In addition to the added value tax reform implemented in 1988 and local fiscal reform of law 94-
11 implemented in 1994 , the tax reform was continued during the 9th  plan to introduce greater 
harmonization between the different tax regimes and to compensate the shortfall in revenue 
resulting from the entry into force of the program of dismantling of tariffs and charges having 
equivalent effect following the implementation of the agreement of association and cooperation 
agreement with the European Union. 
The fundamental goal is to increase the share of direct taxes in total tax revenue and focus the 
effort level of indirect taxes on domestic rather than the taxes charged on imports.  
To achieve this objective, the main reform revolves around the following points: 
? The improvement of performance through better tax collection;  
? The widening of tax base and taxes by the reduction of special tax regimes;  
? Consolidation of the value added tax in order to put all the sectors on the same footing;  
? Rationalization of tax incentives to promote investment in accordance with priorities. 
In addition to these reforms, a range of measures has been taken to strengthen the efficiency of 
taxes and further optimize the distribution of tax burden.  
Among these measures include the publication of the “code and tax procedures” and increased 
awareness of the operations of associations and professional bodies to encourage taxpayers to 
file their statements within statutory deadlines and with the transparency required and 
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strengthening the control administration tax by the human and material necessary (software 
applications). 
4. Financial and monetary policy 
 
In addition to the reforms of preceding decade, the 9th  plan period known for continuing the 
process of modernizing the banking system and strengthening its technical and financial capacity 
to support changes in the economic arena.  
As such the focus has been placed on improved methods of management by the use of 
technology, the introduction of advanced computer systems and establishment of data bank 
systematically updated to master the operations of Risk assessment. 
Effort was also taken on a more flexible legal framework to suit the requirements of the next 
period on opening on the outside and to strengthen the complementarities between the different 
categories of banks to promote the emergence of centers capable of mobilizing financial 
resources appropriate to double both internally and externally.  
Regarding monetary policy, the 9th plan period has been, in addition to the continued mastery of 
liquidity, the consecration of the qualitative and indirect monetary policy and the gradual 
establishment of political open market and that, through the modernization of the mechanisms 
used in money market and product diversification especially Treasury bills and the revision of 
procedures relating to the financing of the treasure. 
Also, development and revitalization of the financial market are considered among the main 
objectives set for the next period, given the role of this step in the mobilization of domestic and 
foreign savings and optimal allocation for the financing of various economic activities. 
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In this respect, efforts were intensified during the 9th plan to continue to modernize the financial 
market and the introduction of appropriate organizational measures to facilitate the task of the 
various structures and specialized agencies while ensuring the improvement of the quality of 
services provided both to investors and developers.  
Specific interest was, also, given to the insurance industry to improve its efficiency and promote 
delivery and new services to support the productive sectors and allow the mobilization of savings, 
including the long term.  
Liberalization of external financing was pursued with the objective to move towards full 
convertibility of the dinar which is a key factor in the completion of structural reforms, in 
addition to its role as an effective tool for promoting trade with outside and to ensure the entry of 
foreign capital including direct investment and venture capital. 
F. Sectoral and social policy : 
 
1.   strategies of sectors development  
 
The sectors guideline and policies seek to reinforce potentially profitable activities, to take 
advantage of all opportunities that could contribute to the development process, and to identify 
additional sources of growth particularly through getting access to new markets, and increasing 
the competitive advantages of firms. The ultimate purpose of this approach is to insure the 
participation of all sectors in achieving the objectives set in order to upgrade the national 
economy allowing its integration into the world economy.  
The principal axes of sectors development was firstly to diversify production and improve the 
quality of products and thus the competitiveness of national production and an increase in 
exports, secondly to develop agricultural production and foster the continued growth of this 
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sector decreasing the effects of natural factors, thus ensuring food security and the reduction of 
the trade deficit , thirdly to upgrade business firms operating in various sectors, and particularly 
in industry and agriculture. This would prepare them for the liberalization of foreign trade and 
the upcoming implementation of a number of agreements adopted within the WTO, especially 
those relating to the liberalization of the service sector and the elimination of the multi-fiber 
arrangements. 
Fourth to develop and improve infrastructure since services such as transport, communication , 
etc play an important role in supporting productive activities and competitiveness, in improving 
living conditions for citizens, and in ensuring integration in the world economy . 
Fifth to improve human resources and prepare them to meet the challenges of the future, 
particularly the challenge of acquiring technological know-how. 
The last principal is to grant a greater role to the private sector in implementing sectors policies 
and programs by giving it access to new activities such as infrastructure support and public 
services through the concession system. 
The optimal allocation of investments among sectors reflects the above objectives: the amounts 
set aside for each sector have been defined on the basis of defined priorities and in light of their 
potential contribution to exports and economic growth. 
2. strategies of regional development 
 Guidance in this area aimed to ensure participation of all the regions with the national effort, 
and influence of development across the whole territory of the country, and in an environment 
which upholds the market economy and the gradual integration of the global sphere. 
The main lines consist of:  
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? The adaptation of strategies of regional development based on own potentialities and 
exploitation of dynamic activities they cover; 
? The granting of special interest to the region with no pre-development factors; 
? Enhancing the complementarities and solidarity between the regions having the same 
problems of development; 
More precisely the action of development at the regional level strived to:  
? Confer the status of overall development efforts and ensure the spread of development 
across all regions as the leaves appear to increase public investments in all governorates, 
without exception; 
? Boost the development in the governorates of the West through the strengthening of 
their shares in the total public investment has reserved the basic infrastructure and public 
facilities. This pulse refers to programs selected for the agricultural sector. Indeed, in 
addition to the dams of Sidi-Barrak, barbara and Zarga, governorates of the West saw the 
creation of 80 hillside dams, 226 small lakes and development of 12,000 ha of irrigated 
areas. 
? These regions have also experienced the development of road network, while enjoying 
50% of rural roads program, besides the establishment of two university centers such 
Jendouba and Gafsa and, in addition to the creation of some nucleus in the other 
governorates; 
? supporting and strengthening the dynamism that knows the coastal zone of the country 
in connection with the specifics of the new step with what it requires as improving 
competitiveness through the development of basic infrastructure such as roads and 
structuring the doubling the railway line Tunis-Sousse, the extension of airports Tunis 
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Carthage, Monastir and Djerba , action also focused on the development of industrial 
areas, the consolidation of university centers including the creation of institutes of higher 
technology and diversification of courses and specialties in the field of vocational 
training; 
? Develop the medial axis in order to extend the dynamic development of the coastline to 
the interior regions via the medial axis and through the consolidation of the east-west 
road network and the establishment of industrial zones appropriate in some cities. 
It is clear from all these guidelines and policies that mark the action of development during 
the years 1995-2001, the goals are the achievement of a comprehensive and sustainable 
development based on a better distribution of the fruits of growth and broad participation of 
all potentialities. 
3. Banking reform programs: 
 
In this framework the second adjustment loan for the competitiveness of the economy supported 
efforts of government in the following areas: 
? Settlement of debts hanging of public and semi-public enterprises vis-a vis banks 
? Modernization of banking activities; 
? Bank restructuring and improvement of management; 
? Modernization of the Treasury securities market; 






i. Settlement of debts hanging of public and para-public enterprises vis-a vis banks 
 
Strengthening the financial base of the Tunisian banking system is an absolute priority of 
economic and financial policy. The government has intensified efforts to overcome the 
difficulties inherent in recovering debts for banks and their interest Backup. Appropriate 
solutions have been identified to absorb the clean debts and hung bank's portfolio. 
In this respect, a range of measures was implemented to ensure the settlement of most of the 
debts held by banks hung on public enterprises and public participation. 
Immediate action on a list of 138 companies, for an amount of debts totaling to 768MD were 
arrested in connection with the Finance Act 1999 for management (budget of 1999). 
The program was supported by the World Bank on the settlement of debts hanging of 49 public 
enterprises and semi-public totaling approximately 710MD. 
In parallel, arrangements was met in place to ensure that public institutions that are an extension 
of the administration can any more use bank loans without the guarantee of the state. 
In the Same vision and to reduce the time of liquidation of public sector enterprises, a bill 
amending the laws on 1 February 1989 related to participation , public enterprises and public 
institutions was adopted for a particular to limit the period of execution of programs of approved 
liquidation to 3 years. 
ii. Modernization of banking activities  
 
The actions foreseen in this program cover, at the same time, the institutional, legal and 
regulatory framework as well as logistical and technical. 
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The new provisions should aim for greater development of banking and the establishment of 
appropriate measures to ensure sound and secure banking system to shocks both external and 
internal. 
In this framework, the government launched a comprehensive plan to tackle nonperforming 
loans (NPLs). The plan entailed government assumption of banks’ claims on certain public 
enterprises in return for noninterest bearing 25 year notes. Legislation allowing the transfer of 
NPLs to Asset Management Companies (AMCs) was also introduced and banking supervision 
was strengthened. As a result, NPLs fell from 25 percent in 1996 to 19 percent in 200159. 
New dispositions should include the introduction of the single license to remove the partitioning 
of the banking activity and to allow each bank to perform according to its potential: financial, 
technical and commercial banking in all trades and specialize if that is his interest, clarifying the 
obligations and responsibilities board of directors and managers, definition the conditions and 
modalities of intervention of the authorities during the financial failure of a bank. 
The government gives special attention to the implementation of the technical part of the 
modernization of the banking system to bring it into line with developments recorded on the 
international scene in this area. 
The actions chosen are particularly: 
? The improvement of payment methods through the introduction of a modern system of 
clearing which limit the operation to 48 hours. 
? The establishment of an information center which will provide banks with reliable 
                                      
59  IMF country report 2002 
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information in real time in order to assist them in the assessment of risk and decision 
making to optimize their management and control risks incurred. 
? The establishment, under the control of the central bank of each bank's own back-up 
center to restore the data and ensuring where appropriate, resumption of normal 
execution of normalized daily operations. 
?  The constitution of a company specialized in order to secure transportation of funds. 
? Consolidating electronic money system for improvement of its institutional framework 
and standardization and the development of offered products. 
iii. Bank restructuring and improvement of management 
Management of public banks has been more relaxed thanks to the Upgrades of their management. 
This purpose, the threshold of 34% giving banks the nature of public enterprise has been revised. 
Other actions have been implemented to allow more flexibility to management of banks 
structures through greater accountability and clarification of responsibilities and duties of the 
board of directors, managers and auditors, ... 
Iv. Modernization of the Treasury securities market and monetary management 
instruments 
Through the improvement of the efficiency of the financial system, the governments introduced 
more Harmonization between different compartments of the capital market and ensure its proper 
functioning. For this and to ensure a better mastery of the instruments of monetary management 
and optimize the process of refinancing and allocation of resources, the improvements were 
introduced on the mechanisms of market functioning and the mode of action of various operators 
to promote the conduct of indirect monetary policy. This purpose, the role of the central bank in 
the market for treasury bonds was broadened to enable it to conduct operations in open market. 
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Given the requirements of modernization, Tunis Stock Exchange, the financial market reforms 
advocated by the government touch specialized financial institutions, like mutual funds that 
occupy a privileged place of the strategy to boost the activity exchanges. Improvements were 
introduced at the last of these regulations and accounting system specific to their activities was 
adopted. Same brokerage firms have been equipped, for their part, a specific regulation that suits 
their requirements and allocation of the modernization of financial market structure. 
V. consolidation in the insurance sector and strengthening the regulatory framework 
for non-bank institutions 
Reform of the insurance sector is one of the main axes of the financial policy. The approach 
adopted by the government aims to restructure the financing of certain companies and the 
adoption of appropriate measures to promote certain classes of insurance and the development of 
the sector's regulatory framework. 
Insurance companies were asked to modernize their methods of management to improve 
productivity of the sector in general and prepare for the opening on the outside. 
A new accounting system was adopted to promote transparency in financial statements of 
insurance companies and harmonize the conduct of their accounts. 
G. Macroeconomic policy and Stabilization : 
 
Since its beginning the SAPs focus firstly on stabilization of macroeconomic indicators and 
balance of payment problems, monetary policy was the key to reestablish the BOP deficit. 
Prior to 1986, the main objectives of the BCT were to provide credit to support the government’s 
economic development plan. The BCT controlled the growth and distribution of credit as well as 
interest rate , commercial bank should seek the approval of BCT to fix their relative  interest 
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rate , particular low interest rate was given to a particular sector investment such tourism, 
manufacturing and heavy equipment, export and SMEs. In fact, the real interest rate given to 
priority sector loan was negative for most of the cases over the period 1972-1985. This heavy 
subsidized credit created an incentive to invest in low-return project and shortness investment in 
other fields of the economy. Repayment of loan was very low. The real interest rate on term 
deposit was also mostly negative over the same period. Thus reduced the amount of savings 
channeled through the banking sector could not satisfy the large demand for loans that the 
artificially low interest rates had generated. The excess demand for loans created the need for an 
expansion in money supply, which in turn led to a significant rise of inflation which reaches the 
rate of 8-9 per cent. Given that the nominal exchange rate was fixed with main trading partners, 
inflation hundred the competitiveness of Tunisian products designed for export which led later to 
unsustainable current account deficit by 1986. The BCT react quickly by devaluating the dinar 
(local currency) and changed its monetary and exchange rate policy. 
The two major initiated policy which aim to improve the efficiency of credit allocation and 
maintaining equilibrium in the external account was ; (i) a shift from direct control of credit and 
money expansion to indirect management through refinance facilities and (ii) a gradual 
elimination of preferential interest rates and quotas. 
i. interest rate policy :  
 
Preferential interest rates for priority sector remain continuous. Although their share in 
outstanding banks loans declined sharply, authority intends to eliminate it totally. Non 
preferential interest rates have been considerably liberalized, and all interest rate controls have 




 9. Interest rate evolution 
The stability of the BCT-controlled rates over time results mainly from a policy of monetary 
expansion based on interest rate targeting. The BCT only partially fulfills the bank’s demand for 
auctioned funds and through dissuasion, curtails the use of the pension. Although refinancing 
facilities are open to all banks, some credit access regulation must be in effect in view of the fact 
that the interest rates are so stable and the BCT has a target for monetary growth. The use of the 
interest rate as an intermediate target of monetary policy-that is, pegging the interest rate by 
accommodating money demand changes-may not accomplish an important objective of the 
Central Bank, namely the minimization of real GDP fluctuations around its full employment 
level. In an economy with limited international capital mobility and a managed exchange rate, 
targeting the interest rate will lead to smaller fluctuation in GDP only if the main source of 
uncertainty arises from shocks to the demand for money. However, if the main source of 
uncertainty resides in the demand for goods and services or in aggregate supply, then interest rate 
pegging will lead to higher GDP fluctuation. In Tunisia, shocks to aggregate supply and the 
demand for goods and services are a significant source of uncertainty. Given the importance of 
the nonmonetary shocks a mixed (interest rate /money supply) targeting rule seems more 
appropriate to minimize fluctuation of real GDP around its full-employment level in Tunisia. 
(See APPENDICE: monetary policy instrument). 
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ii. Inflation and other monetary developments: 
 
The annual inflation rate decreased from an average of 9.5% during the first half of 1980s to 
6.2% during the period of 1986-94 (table 10). 
year 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Inflation 
rate 
8.9 13.7 9.0 8.5 8.0 5.8 7.2 6.3 7.7 6.5 8.2 5.8 4.0 4.5
 
 10. Inflation rate (CPI) source BCT 
 After the stabilization program of 1986, the average growth rate of the money supply (M1 
&M2) decreased significantly, in accordance with a policy of inflation control (Table 11 ). 
Starting in 1988, domestic credit was redirected away from the central government. As of 1994, 
92% of domestic credit was allocated to the private sector and public enterprises. The reduction 
of money financing of the budget deficit was accomplished by the introduction of competitively 
priced treasury bills in late 1989. Since 1986 the growth rate of quasi money (M2) has been 
consistently higher than that of M1 due in part to the consistently positive real saving interest 
rates in the period. However, since 1989 the velocity of M2 has trended upwards as more 
attractive long-term financial instruments became available. In 1988, commercial paper (issued 
by nonfinancial institutions) and certificates of deposit (issued by commercial banks) were 
introduced, open-and closed-end mutual funds (SICAVs and SICAFs) were started, and in 1989 
treasury bills were successfully introduced. The rising ratio of M3 to M1 provides evidence of 
the degree of financial deepening occurring in Tunisia over that period.  
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 11. Monetary indicators; source BCT 
iii. Balance of payment and exchange rate policy: 
 
During 1986-87, the BCT devalued the Tunisian dinar, including a real depreciation of about 
27%. Starting in 1987, the Tunisian government initiated a program of trade liberalization, aimed 
at shifting resources from inefficient import-substituting activities to the export sector, and a 
policy of fiscal deficit control, to diminish the need for external savings. These policies were 
successful in reducing the current account deficit to an average of 4% of GDP during 1986-93. 
The reduction of the current account deficit was particularly important in 1987 and 1988 due to 
the strong effects of the real exchange rate depreciation combined with an excellent agriculture 
crop, an increase in oil prices, and the near doubling of tourism receipts caused by the opening of 
the border with Libya in 1988. From 1989 to 1993, the current account deficit gradually rose and 
due to a deteriorate of the term of trade in the period 90-92 and a recovery of private sector 
investment, following some trade liberalization measures and the devaluation of the dinar .the 
current account deficit fell sharply in 1994 with an unusually large sale of olive oil stocks, lower 
imports with the economic slowdown, and stronger manufactured exports. 
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Tunisia rather sizable trade deficit and the large role of tourism receipts and worker’s remittances 
in financing the trade deficit make Tunisia’s external position vulnerable to adverse 
developments in the region’s economic and political stability. 
In early 1994 the BCT introduced an interbank foreign exchange market, which expected to lead 
to a market determined exchange rate. The Tunisian government aimed to full convertibility of 
the dinar.  
iv. saving and investment : 
 
The savings-investment relationship is, of course, the domestic counterpart to the current account 
balance, and its analysis sheds light on, among other things, the sustainability of the country's 
external position. National (and domestic) savings decreased steadily during the first years of the 
1980s from 24.6 percent in 1980 to 15.5 per cent in 1986. Subsequently, the declining trend was 
reversed and in 1992-93, national savings averaged 22.2 percent of GDP .This recovery was 
strongly led by non central government national savings, which rose gradually from 9.6 percent 
in 1986 to an average of 21.0 percent in 1992-93. Gross domestic investment was fairly stable 
during 1980-84 at around 31 percent of GDP Then, in the midst of the balance-of-payment crisis 
and the ensuing adjustment program, it decreased to 19.4 percent of GDP in 1988.Most of this 
decline was due to a contraction in gross fixed investment by the non central government, 
especially by public enterprises. From 1989, gross domestic investment recovered strongly to an 
average of 29.7 percent of GDP in 1992-93  this recovery was led by private investment, which 
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responded favorably to the stronger macroeconomic stability and the new incentive structure 
generated by the structural reforms, and by some public enterprises. 
Overall many reforms was made in different fields and with a step wise manners in order to 
avoid shocks and to ensure awareness about the openness of the economy, so what was there 
effect on the economy and macroeconomic variables . 















 Chapter 4 
Performances of Tunisian economy and analysis of SAPs effects 
 
In this chapter I will try to analyze the results of the practice of SAPs and the performance of 
Tunisian economy after 1986 compared to the pre-adjustment period. I will try to answer the 
questioning impacts of SAPs on Tunisian economy, especially by focusing on the behavior of 
certain specific macroeconomic variables. 
I. Situation  before any reforms:  
 
As mentioned before the economic situation before any reforms was critic especially over the 
period of 1980 -1986 which witnesses a profound crisis that harmed the economy 
competitiveness, touched all the economy and deteriorate the external position of Tunisian 
economy especially the main macroeconomic indicators which lead to a rethinking about the 
policy of protectionism pursued until that time.  
The main economic and social indicators were as follow; 
? Total factors productivity growth was negative -1.7% and the productivity of capital 
declined by 4.3% 
? Exports decreased by 0.8% in average each year and imports by 1.1% 
? In 1982-1986, the yearly average rate of GDP growth was 3.6% and 1% for GDP per 
capita. 
? The investment rate was 30.2% in average in the period of 1980-1986. 




? A huge budget deficit of 5.2% of GDP in the period 81-86 with expenditures reaching 
40% of GDP in the year  85-86 
? Non-oil revenue that constitutes 30% of GDP.  
? Expansionary monetary policy maintained by the financial needs of the budget and public 
enterprises as well as real interest rates too , sometimes null, which contributes not only 
to demand of credit but also to some distortions in the allocation of credit and to a 
weakness financial system, 
? Rising external current account deficit which rose from 5% of GDP in 1980 up to 11% in 
1984 and then stabilized at 8% in 1985-86 reflecting the high level of collective demand 
and slowing exports and the overvaluation of the currency, in the face of deteriorating 
terms of trade. 
? The rising level of external debt which amounts to 38% of GDP in 1981 to 63% in 1986 
and the solvency ratio has doubled from 14% of current jobs to 28% in 1986. 
II. Realization after the reforms of 1986-1997: 
 
 
The reforms was implemented by steps so it should be mention that each step led to certain 
results that encourage to begin the next step but we can identify two main phases , the 
stabilization and the openness of the economy. 
1. Economic reforms of the period 1986-92: 
 
In 1986 Tunisia has implemented a great reform implied by the Structural adjustment programs 
provided by the IMF and World Bank to save the economy from the big recession that happened 
in that time and causes many macroeconomic problem and weakness. These programs aimed to 
accelerate the GDP growth in the framework of openness to the exterior. Obtained results were 
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on the level of expectations. In average the product is increased in pace of 4.4% by year over the 
period 1987-92 with an inflation rate that achieve more than 7%. The balance of current 
payments and the fiscal balance (public budget) remained in the margins financially bearable 
deficits, less than 4%. Golf crisis (august 1991) and the decrease of oil revenues induces a flow 
of new decade beginning more difficult. 
Between 1992 and 1993, the current account balance has been particularly heavy loss, requiring 
a careful management of monetary mass. In average the M2 grew at a real growth target of 
around 5 to 6% and an expected global inflation of around 3%. In parallel, the exchange rate 
policy was sufficiently flexible to stabilize and even slightly improve the competitiveness of the 
economy by comparison with Europe, its main export market. Between 1987 and 1992, the index 
of real effective exchange rate has indeed depreciates by 2.5 %.( APPENDICE 6) 
2. Effects on macroeconomic variables: 
 
This period was very interesting to stabilize growth and main economic indicators such 
mastering inflation and reducing budget deficit and debt ratio. Indeed the IMF was successful to 
help Tunisian authority to achieve these goals, in fact the GDP growth increase to 4.4 and 
inflation decrease to 6.9 in the end of 1992. 
3. Controlling  inflation rate policy : 
 
Implementation by government a monetary and fiscal conservative policy, certainly has a 
restrictive effect on domestic demand and hence on price developments. However, measures of 
regulation by the application whose scope is essentially short term are often ineffective and result 
in a negative impact on investment and production and, consequently, employment and export 
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which are cornerstones of economic policy and social life. That's why they put more emphasis on 
expanding production, so supply, to adapt to changing demand and thus successfully controlling 
the phenomenon of inflation. Meanwhile, authorities have spared in recent years, no effort to 
fight inflation by implementing a package of measures in order institutional and regulatory 
affecting several aspects. These include, reducing rigidities in existing distribution channels to 
avoid hindering the supply of markets through, inter alia, the consolidation of the transport sector 
and encouragement by financial resources, intermediaries to improve conditions for the 
establishment of buffer stocks. Similarly, control of inflation through cost containment 
production, the only guarantee for lasting stability in prices and hence the exchange rate of the 
currency. Thus, households will have to accept a moderate evolution of their income, because 
their purchasing power is saved, and businesses can properly and positively anticipate their 
investment decisions. 
Furthermore, great efforts have been made towards the liberalization of prices, promoting 
competition, respect for market rules and transparency of distribution channels and trading. The 
new legislative and regulatory framework that came into force in 1991 was therefore made a 
qualitative leap in this area. As for the Administration which continued to act indirectly through 
mechanisms of control of supply and demand and Punishment, where appropriate, of course 
slippages in accordance with the spirit of liberalization and law. Moreover, if an excessive 
increase in prices not justified by objective factors, governments can directly act to restore 
equilibrium and impose a normal evolution of prices. 
In addition, the law on competition and prices for July 1991 contains provisions deterrent against 
unfair competition. This was supplemented in this sense by the rules on consumer protection for 
the repression of false advertising, deception and falsification. 
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Under the draft law on consumer protection, the role of the state is limited to control and regulate 
the market, ensuring the presentation of any goods or services under normal conditions of use 
and safety. It was also reinforced by the establishment of a National Institute of consumption 
(NIC) to be the vocation of a technical center for consumers, in addition to strengthening the 
work of existing structures for hygiene control, as this is particularly true of the National Institute 
of Nutrition. 
Regarding distribution channels, the agenda includes, among others, their level of sanitation in 
the flow of agricultural products and this by adopting a framework law regulating the operation 
of the business of wholesale and retail sales. 
In the same vein, the increased competition, both internal and externally to give the economy 
more efficient and competitiveness was supported by a progressive liberalization of imports of 
competitive products that are interested, now the final consumer goods60. 
4. Results and lessons from eighth plan 
 
The period 1992-1996 which represent the eighth plan aiming at maintaining a five-year of 
incentive was a good tool to mobilize all forces in order to boost the economy and enhance 
liberalization. Compared to interventionism that witnessed the last decade (before 
implementation of SAPs in 1986) government become more attached to develop the base for 
market-based economy with agreement to political will of liberalization. With a certain manner 
the plan prepare the administration to meet these challenges in a macroeconomic coherence, to 
negotiate with international institutions and especially European Union. 
                                      
60  Central bank report 1991. pp 91-92 
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In the eighth plan in which Tunisia obtain a 160 million Euros under aid common program, the 
question is what are the results of this challenging plan of transformation? 
In the period of 1992-1996 Tunisia acquired many results in different fields and this in spite of 
cyclical difficulties which affect the economic situation.  
The principal results were (Appendice 6): 
The realization of an average annual growth rate of around 4.6% thanks to the evolution of the 
sectors of non-food manufacturing (6.5%) and services (6.3%), which revealed the contribution 
of these sectors to the GDP growth of 45.5% in 1991 to 48.4% in 1996; the substantial 
improvement in productivity of production factors which contributed one-third due to the 
realization of the growth rate recorded, reflecting the impact of reforms and reflects a significant 
change in the behavior of different stakeholders and their commitment to these reforms; 
increased exports by an annual average of about 6.3% in constant prices exceeding thus the 
evolution of global demand, which has strengthened the hand of Tunisia on foreign markets and 
increase the rate of coverage of imports by exports from 89% in 1991 to 96.6% in 1996. Mastery 
of the price increased reflected through an average annual rate not exceeding 4.8% to support the 
competitiveness of Tunisian products, knowing that the period of eighth plan was crowned by 
the achievement of an inflation rate of 3.7% in 1996, a rate close to the level in several partner 
countries, safeguard of financial equilibrium through the rationalization of public expenditures 
and limiting the budget deficit to about 3.5% of GDP on average per year, as well as through the 
intensification of efforts to mobilize adequate external resources to further the improvement of 
debt indicators. Indeed, the debt ratio has reached 51.4% of national disposable income in 1996, 
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against 53.2% in 1991 and the ratio of debt servicing fell from 21.5% of current revenue in 1991 
to 17.7% in 1996. 
The results of economic policy have been accompanied by significant achievements in social 
level, obtained thanks to the proactive policy in this area and has enjoyed particular attention to 
the Social Dimension. 
This realizations was intensified of job creation and by an amelioration and increase in wages by 
the adoption of two three-year programs of wage increases and the continued policy of clearing 
commodity, while ensuring that they refer to the classes who are most in need and most 
disadvantaged and the implementation of accompanying measures in their favor. These measures 
relate in particular to the raising of the amount of compensation awarded to needy families and 
the adoption of specific programs for the benefit of shadows61. Moreover, the social costs are 
given priority in allocation of resources; social transfers reached 19.3% of GDP in 1996 against 
18.3% in 1987. 
Effort was, also, increased to improve living conditions in different regions of the country. Thus, 
the rate of rural electrification has improved from 29.3% in 1984 to 63.7% in 1994 and the rate 
of drinking water supply reaches approximately 68.3% in 1994 62 . Also the creation of national 
funds for solidarity 26-2663 was the most important measure taken in the eighth plan in the social 
field ,this funds allow in a very short time to improve life condition in the shadows areas and 
                                      
61  The interior areas which mean the rural area and those isolated from economic circuit; it was 
the base for creation of the national funds of solidarity 26-26.  
62  Source :The national company of exploitation and distribution of water (soned) 
63  Established by virtue of the 1993 Finance Law (articles 29 through 33), the National Solidarity 
Fund (also known as “26-26 Fund ” with reference to its current account number) aims at financing the 
various interventions decided by the Head of State for low-income social categories and for regions 
deprived of the basic infrastructure, and which are not covered by the ordinary projects and programs of 
the State and local collectivities. Presidency web site 
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strengthen the value of mutual aid and support between different social groups making the 
solidarity of a national culture.64 
These results confirm the capacity available to the economy to adapt to demands for greater 
openness to the outside. They also highlight a number of key lessons including: 
? The imperative to preserve the internal and external financial balance given the impact 
of tariff dismantling on the rate of import tax revenues, which requires the strengthening 
of national savings and greater rigor in public Finance as to mobilize own resources to 
allocate these resources according to priorities of the plan. 
? The need to work towards greater diversification of the economy and finding new 
sources of growth based in particular on the areas in which Tunisia has a competitive 
advantage having regard to the depletion of some traditional sources of growth and 
fluctuating nature of certain sectors, particularly agriculture whose share in GDP 
declined from 16.7% in 1991 to 13.7% in 1996 
? The great interest to pursuit the improvement of productivity and the overall factors of 
production as a key source of growth, further intensifying the pace of investment both 
domestic and foreign, regarded as an effective means of acquiring technology, 
modernization of production units and strengthening The infrastructure. 
5. The performance of the economy at the end of 1996: 
The policy of liberalization and openness which has been followed for nearly ten years 
(1996) has already produced the following results65: 
? Resumption of growth: +4.5% per year between 1987 and 1996, despite four 
                                      
64  Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April/May 1999, pages 30-32  
65  COMET Report , written by Radhi meddeb , London,  October 1997 
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years of drought. 
? Improved competitiveness: exports have increased at an annual rate of 6.75%, 
and accounted for 43% of GDP in 1996. 
? A sound financial situation: the budget deficit was brought down to 3.8% of GDP 
in 1996 after reaching a high of 6% in 1986, and service on the debt was reduced 
to 17.7% of export proceeds, after peaking at 28% in 1986. 
? The per capita GDP growth rate increased significantly from an average of 1.15 
percent a year for the period 1981-86 to 2.44 percent a year for the period 1987-
94. 
? Lastly, improved living conditions and an improved standard of living: in 1996, 
Tunisia's middle class represents 60% of the population, with only 6.7% of the 
population affected by poverty, compared with 11% in 1985. 
   These results was encouraging steps to make an agreement with EU and the establishment of 
a free-trade zone with it , which is an element in the logic of expanded structural adjustment of 
the Tunisian economy, and is perceived as an opportunity to confirm and intensify efforts that 
began in 1986-87, and to induce substantial transmittal of growth. 
The orientation towards gradual integration into the world economy is now (end of 8th plan of 
development) considered irreversible in Tunisia and the SAP should be continued. 
Nevertheless, much still remains to be done if Tunisia achieves further acceleration of economic 
growth and welfare for its citizens. 
III. Global analysis of effects of SAPs on Tunisian economy till 1997  
 
The first period of adjustment concerned mainly the effort of stabilization and internal 
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restructuring through the deregulation and easiness of procedures to invest and do business, these 
in order to create a dynamic for economy and promote trade and build a base of market economy 
to open it to outside competition later. 
The period witnesses an amelioration of macroeconomic situation of all indicators as we can see 
in the table below (table 12). 
 
1. Evolution of macroeconomic key indicators 
 




GDP growth 4.4 3.9 5.4 6 to 7 (I) 
 
(II) Inflation rate(consumption 
prices)  
6.9 4.6 3.7 2 to 3 







 0 to -2 







 0 to -1 
 Tools     
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(V) Growth of M2 10.4 9.8 16.5  
(VI) index change of real effective exchange rate 
 
-0.4 0.2 100=1990 
104.5=1997 
 
12. Evolution of macroeconomic key indicators 
 
(a) Central bank of Tunisia  
(b) IMF statistics 
Source: IMF and central bank 
The average growth rate has slowed by half a point compared to the 4.4% registered in 1987-
92,but this rate covers population growth and allows elevation of the average standard of living 
as defined by the ratio of GDP to population. This rate is also similar to these of nine 
Mediterranean partners. Inflation continues to decline year after year to be at the level of drift in 
prices observed in industrialized countries. Perform were gained, despite the reduction of 
subsidies and the liberalization of domestic prices and without a restrictive growth of M2. 
The budgetary and current account also reveals a level of deficit that needs correcting. 
Since 1992 Tunisia was present on the international financial markets. This presence is the sign 
of the credit granted him by the international financial community. But like all emerging 
countries, such recognition has recently been coupled with a tightening of conditions for granting 
loans. Therefore, that the public debt and guaranteed by the state is acceptable in the evolution of 
its stock and its structure, the authorities should exercise caution in managing demand. 
The acceleration of growth of GDP should first results from efforts at the offer which the 
authorities succeeded to achieve in the next plan. 
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In this approach the government should promote the private sector growth which should be able 
to face international competitiveness; cost and price of exchange. This major challenge involves 
making more effort to modernize the productive system and the mastery of salary costs. 
In summary, Tunisia has maintained a balanced macroeconomic framework so that the 
liberalization of foreign trade began and was manifested with her and the period witness the first 
consequence of the operation in the budget and balance of payments (1997). The obtained 
performance out between 1992 and 1997 fully justified the financial support from the European 
Union. The structural adjustment process should, however, accelerate and strengthen the 
coherence of the liberalization of goods with that of factors to create the conditions for faster 
development of the private sector which now holds the solutions of the effective use of abundant 
human resources. 
2. Orientations of 9th plan and achieved results: 
 
i. Principal orientations of 9th plan of Structural adjustment 
 
While the world has experienced profound changes, Tunisia entered a new stage of its 
development process, marked by openness and integration of increasingly thrust into the world 
economy. Signing the Association Agreement with the European Union is in this respect, a 
central phase and an appropriate way to strengthen the liberalization of the Tunisian economy 
and intensify cooperation with EU. 
Orientations and priorities of development was designed in the light of previous results and 
lessons learned and taking into account the requirements of the period which have the goal to 
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confer more effectiveness to structure of production and to diversify the economy in order to 
enhance its capacity to defend competitiveness. 
This is needs to upgrade all the economy. The principal orientation concern: 
? Strengthening the openness of the economy through the establishment of free zone of 
trade with European union and pursue the integration in the exterior environment also 
consolidation of the role of private sector and enhancement of initiative as an engine of 
development measures . 
? Adaptation of sectoral orientation to imperatives to streamline the allocation of resources 
on the one hand, and requirements for acceleration of growth, increased job creation and 
export promotion, on the other; 
? The development of the infrastructure and modernization to improve the efficiency of 
services provided, and thereby contribute to strengthening the economy competitiveness; 
? The human resource development so that it fits the requirements for command of 
technology and creation of new sources of productivity; 
? Strengthening achievements recorded in terms of social development , mainly through 
increased job creation and improvement of prospects for integration of jobseekers in the 
economy and this, beyond the consolidation of operations from the National fund of 
Solidarity which aim  to eradicate  poverty in all areas of shadow and improve living 
conditions in general; 
? Driven regional development crossing the preparation conditions that can ensure the 
contribution of all regions with the national effort for development. 
In total the principal objectives of 9th plan was to: 
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? Rising of the rate of growth that is expected to average 6% in constant prices; 
? Increased investment effort by increasing the investment rate that should be 
increased from 23% realized in 1996 to  27.5% in 2001; 
? Reduction of deficit of current external payments of 2.9% of GDP in 1996 to 
2.2% in 2001; 
? The control of budget deficit by limiting it to 2.0% of GDP in 2001 against 
4.3% in 1996. 
The 9th plan was a transition period for Tunisian economy witnessing a great change to 
reach real liberalization and openness and good try of integration to the world economy which 
represent a long run goal of the structural adjustment that begin in late 1986, the plan build the 
basic base to begin the second reform generation which target the global integration of the 
economy. 
ii. Evolution of principal economic indicators in the 9th plan 
13. Evolution of main economic indicators (Current prices, in Million Dinar) source: ministry of 
development and international cooperation 




GDP(market prices) 18966.5 20868.6 22947.6 25284.2 27998.1 30938.1 10.2 
GNP 17937.9 19829.8 21796.6 24048.9 26705.1 29591.4 10.4 
Gross national 
disposable income 
19699.8 20571.6 22620.0 24977.3 27771.2 30770.6 10.3 
National saving  3995.4 4580.2 5199.4 5945.4 6935.5 7971.9 14.6 
Investment  4569.9 5350.0 5900.0 6613.0 7405.0 8507.0 13.4 
External debt  9620.0 10360.0 10980.0 11505.0 12060.0 12580.0 6.0 
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Debt rate  51.4 50.4 48.5 46.1 43.4 40.9  
Debt service  1599.1 1800.0 2060.0 2130.0 2535.0 2390.0 12.0 
Rate debt service 17.7 18.1 18.7 17.5 19.1 16.2  
Population(thousand)  9095.0 9243.4 9391.5 9539.2 9684.4 9833.1 1.6 
Income per 
capita(dinar) 
2070.0 2226.0 2409.0 2591.0 2868.0 3140.0 8.5 
The entire indicators witness big increases which justify the effort implemented by the authority 
in order to enhance the economy to meet the challenge of new century, this was a successful 
advice of IMF in term of transforming the economy from regulated to open economy after the 
period of stabilization which spread from 1986 to 1994 and which was also successful. Despite 
unfavorable international conditions, the Tunisian economy performed well in 2001, with 4.9% 
GDP growth, lower inflation and a drop in the unemployment rate, thanks to structural reforms 







1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Export of goods 
and services 
5998 610.4 6712.8 7160.7 738.4 882.9 
Import of goods 
and services 
6156.7 661.6 6867.1 7307.2 7741.6 801.7 
14. EVOLUTION OF TRADE  
Foreign trade is one of the main determinants of development scheme which assumes an annual 
growth of 6% of exports of goods and services and 7.2% of exports excluding energy. Imports of 
goods and services witnessed an important rose and this, taking in consideration needs of the 
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production, investment requirements and the need to preserve the equilibrium of the balance of 
payments and the impact of dismantling of customs tariffs. 
We can see the value of export product which exceeds import in 2001; this can be an indicator 
for the success of the trade policy which stimulates global supply and free exchange without 
harming investment, this is also a sign of success in term of competitiveness challenging of 
Tunisian economy but the question here is about the nature of product exported (high value 
added or not) which can give an idea about the composition of Tunisian industry that lack 
innovation and use of high technology, but Tunisia was successful at least in term of substitution 
of importation and export promotion. In this side IMF was successful to guide Tunisian authority 
to apply a good tools for free trade such as decreasing exportation taxes, liberalization of import 
and simplification of quantitative restrictions. 
Macroeconomic variables: 
Principal data at the end of 9th plan 
 
Investment rate  24.1 27.5 
Saving rate  22.3 26.9 




budget deficit / GDP 
 
3.9 2.0 
Debt ratio 51.4 40.9 
rate debt service 
 
17.7 16.2 
15. Macroeconomic variable at the end of 9th plan 
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The realization of the 9th plan in the macroeconomic level was encouraging making it possible to 
reach the stabilization of the major variables; this is more helpful with the structural change that 
witnesses the economy in general. 
We can mention here specially the success of stabilization policy which had a dual objective of 
growth and stabilization and it seems that it reached that goal. Indeed external borrowing must 
promote a long maturity rate of economic growth both high and stable and compatible with a 
situation of balance of payments viable in the medium and long term. It must therefore ensure 
that funds borrowed will generate enough resources for the real foreign service of external 
liabilities can be assured timely which was ensured in the case of Tunisia.  
iii. Comparison of evolution between 8th plan and 9th plan 
 
16. Comparison between 8th and 9th plan performances 
What we can remark in this comparison that there is a great evolution of all the macroeconomic 
indicators due to upgrade of all the economy in the period of 9th plan of development which 




17. Growth of GDP by sector 
Growth rate by sector 8th plan  9th plan 









Non-manufacturing 3.6 4.4 
 
Services 6.3 7.0 
GDP 4.6 6.0 
We can mention here that there is an increase in the part rate of industry and services in GDP 
against a decrease in the part rate of agriculture; this was the orientation of structural adjustment 
which wants to liberalize private initiative and encouragement of market economy. 













Annual average: 8th 
Plan period (1992-
1996) 
Forecast of annual Sectors  
average: 9th Plan period 
(1997-2001) 
Agriculture 
and fisheries  
 
4.02 -1.2 4.3  
Manufacturing 
industry 






-0.16 3.6 4.4 
Services  
 
5.84  6.3 7  
Total 5.84  4.6 6.0  
At the end of SAPs the Tunisian economy seems to perform well and its evolution seems 
accepted in comparison to expectation. All the macroeconomic variables witness an important 
change in favor of economic growth and structural change, the next plan which has a first goal 
the integration of the Tunisian economy to the regional and international environment will be 
more challenging. 
Tunisia needs to remain vigilant in facing these challenges in order to ensure the ongoing quality 
of its macro-economic framework, while also pursuing structural reform which has already 
produced convincing results. The economy over the 1990's reached a new stage in growth of 
more than 5% per year in real terms vs. 3.5% over the previous decade, far above the annual 
1.2% level of demographic growth, allowing coverage of 90% of additional demand for jobs. 
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This development raised national product per capita to 2530 dinars in 1999 vs. 1293 dinars in 
1990, while holding inflation to its lowest level in three decades: 2.7%. There has also been a 
qualitative change in growth, as seen in the emergence of certain more promising new sectors 
which supports reasonable expectations that young graduates' demands for good jobs will be met. 
In light of external payments and improvement in the import / export coverage rate, the current 
deficit in the balance of payments was down to 2.1% of GDP in 1999 vs. 4.3% in 1990. Foreign 
Currency assets were up from the equivalent of 1 .5 months of imports to almost 3 .5 months. 
IV. Social performances after SAPs compared to pre-adjustment period 
 
The policies pursued during the structural adjustment programs strengthened the previous 
performances and had a beneficial effect on individual and collective welfare; the main social 
indicators were as following66: 
? GDP grew by an annual average rate of 5% between 1961 and 2001(Table 19). 
? There was a tremendous increase in the level of education; the percentage of population 
having a primary education increased from 14%in 1960 to 42% in 1997, the percentage 
of population having a secondary level of education increased from 65 to 31% in the 
same period (Table20). 
? The schooling rate in the 6-24 age brackets went up from 37.4 in 1975 to 53.1 in 1984 
and close to 70% in 2001. 
? Public expenditures in the social programs went up from 18.6% of GDP in 1986 to 19.2% 
in 1997, of which 6.9% went to education ,2.3%to health care and close to 10% to direct 
transfers and consumer subsidies 
                                      
66  See tables ,national institute of statistics 
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? Access to health care, drinking water supply and electricity all increased by a substantial 
margin(Table 22). 
? The number of inhabitant by physician went from 1,637 in 1994 to 1,284 in 2000. 
? Infant mortality was 138,6 per thousand in 1966, 51.4 per thousand in 1984 and finally 
25,8 per thousand in 2000. 
? The income per capita rose from 953 in 1986 to 2978 in 2001. 
? The birth rate dropped from 3%in 1966 to 1.o9% in 2000 following an active planning 
family policy. 
? The rate of literacy rose from 45% in1975 to 75.3 in 2001. 
19.  GDP growth rates: 
GDP annual average growth rate 





20. Population split by level of education  
 None Primary Secondary 
and higher 
1960 80 14 6 
1966 77 16 7 
1975 51 33 16 
1980 45 35 20 
1989 33 39 28 






21. Working population split by level of education 
 None Primary secondary higher 
1966 73.9 17.8 7.1 1.2 
1975 53.7 32.0 12.8 1.4 
1984 42.0 34.8 19.9 3.3 
1994 24.2 41.7 28.1 6.0 
1997 19.0 44.2 29.7 7.1 
 









1960 105 11 56 174 2030 
1980 282 52 120 798 2122 
1990 534 66  1306 1938 
2000 783 99 133 1471 1754 
 
Access to electricity and drinking water 
Percentage of households 
 Electricity  Drinking water at 
home 
1966 24 40 
1989 73 58 
1994 87 70 
1999 94 75 







V. Achievement and performance of Tunisian economy during the decade 1997-2006 
 
The 1997-2006 decade is marked by a further tendency towards deregulation, in particular 
through the introduction of a FTZ with the EU, in addition to the continuation of the structural 
reforms whose objective is to consolidate the competitiveness of the economy and its integration 
in the world economy. In addition to the modernization of basic infrastructure, the development 
of human resources, and the upgrading of the industrial sector, these reforms related mainly to 
the tax system, the financial sector, the legislative framework, privatization and the improvement 
of the administrative services. 
Tunisia was able to achieve great progress in the way of deregulating the economy and 
integration in the world economic circuit, during the 1997-2006 decade, especially through the 
installation of the Free Trade Zone with the European Union. Thus, after the deregulation of the 
Dinar as regards current transactions in 1993 and the abolishing of import control in 1994, 
Tunisia made great strides in terms of dismantling customs duties within the framework of 
association agreements with the European Union as well as with other groups of countries. 
Correlatively, the degree of the opening of the economy, total exports and imports compared to 
the GDP, increased to 99% in 2005 versus 86% in 1996. 
Moreover, the process of integration of the national economy within the world economy was 
consolidated through its access to the international financial market, where Tunisia was granted 
positive rating which enabled it to channel important financial resources and to increase its 
international commitments passing from 6.5% of the GDP in 1996 to 17.6% in 2005, at the same 
time with the continued improvement of the conditions on contracted credits. The increased 
integration is also materialized through the evolution of FDI which recorded an upward trend 
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from 1.9% of the GDP in 1996 to 2.7% in 2005. In addition, the number of established 
companies, several of which are multinationals, passed from 1604 in 1996 to 2726 in 2005.  
Tunisia was able to realize a 5% annual average growth rate from 1997 to 2006, which made it 
possible to increase per capita income from 2090 Dinars in 1996 to 4000 Dinars in 2006 and, 
consequently, to get closer to the OECD countries as the adjustment (catch-up) indicator 
illustrates passing from 25% in 1996 to 29% in 2005 . 
As for the sources of growth, this decade was characterized by the favorable contribution of the 
total productivity of factors (TPF), the diversification of the economic base and the crucial role 
played by domestic demand, especially consumption, which made it possible to compensate for 
the decrease in foreign demand during these last years of the decade. 
As regards the TPF, the results reveal an improvement of its contribution to the growth of GDP 
going from 26% during the 8th Plan to 45% during the decade 1997-2006. Such a report is 
attributable mainly to different reforms carried out by the State in order to consolidate 
competitiveness in domestic as well as foreign markets and this, in spite of decreased protection 
and increased competition, in particular, with the widening of the EU and the accession of China 
to the WTO. Moreover, it is important to note that the share of productive services continued to 
increase passing from 39.2% in 1996 to 47% in 2006. Such a result is ascribable mainly to the 
emergence of new sectors with a high potential in the services activities. The share of 
knowledge-intensive activities in GDP continued improving passing from 12.8% in 1997 to 
20.3% in 2006. These activities especially include financial services, health, education, data 
processing, telecommunications and services rendered to the companies and other activities like 
biological agriculture, the pharmaceutical industry, mechanical engineering industries, 
99 
 
electronics and electrical industries. On the other hand, traditional manufacturing industries, such 
as textiles and clothing and activities directed towards the domestic market underwent a 
deceleration of their growth. 
As far as the contribution of foreign demand to growth is concerned, the results reveal the 
important contribution of exports to the enhancement of growth. 
Indeed, it was expected that exports will increase by 6% on average during the decade 1997-
2006 for a growth of 5% of GDP. Such a contribution proves larger than that of the 10th Plan 
because of the precarious international economic situation of the first years of this plan. Such 
results confirm the role of exports in the enhancement of the pace of growth. GDP growth would 
have been more considerable (5.6% versus an expected 4.6%) if exports had maintained their 
rate of growth of the 9th Plan (7.2%). 
Moreover, domestic demand, with its two components of consumption and investment, continues 
to contribute considerably to growth. This contribution is attributable mainly to private 
consumption which increased at a rate of 5.2%, exceeding the growth of GDP. For this reason, it 
is important to note that if domestic demand managed to compensate for the decrease in exports 
during the 10th  Plan, the savings rate appreciably dropped in 2006 to account for 21.7% versus 
23.5% in 2001 and 22.7% in 1996. However, this tendency did not affect foreign payments due 
to the slowdown of investments recorded during this period. 
Total investments, which recorded an average annual growth of 7.6% at current prices, 
underwent important structural changes. Thus, if the investment rate experienced a fall during 
the past decade putting it at 24.4% of GDP versus 25.9% during the 8th Plan, the private sector’s 
share was strengthened from one plan to another with an average annual growth of 8.2% 
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enabling it to increase its share in the total investment from 51% during the 8th Plan to 54.1% 
during the 9th Plan and 56.5% in the 10th Plan. 
Nevertheless, considering the decrease in public sector investments, this share remains 
insufficient to face external repercussions and the sharp increase in the prices of imported raw 
materials. Moreover, the evolution of investments for certain traditional sectors experienced a 
drop related to the saturation of agriculture and agri-business investment and increased 
competition on the foreign market, in particular, in the textile and clothing sectors. However, 
investments carried out in knowledge-intensive activities underwent a significant rise insofar as 
their share of total investment passed from 14% in 1997 to 19.5% in 2004 and to 20% in 2006. 
In parallel, the investments in the growth and innovation sectors increased on average by 14.7% 
compared with only 6.5% for all investments which increased their share from 10% in 1997 to 
16% in 2003. Moreover, foreign investments experienced a quantitative and qualitative rise 
increasing from 733TD on average during the 9th Plan to approximately 1000TD during the 10th 
Plan. It was especially the growth sectors and those with strong value-added such as the 
mechanical, electrical and new information technologies industries which attracted most FDIs. 
The ICT sector saw its imports of equipment increase reaching 16% during the period 2002-2005 
compared with only 9% during the 9th Plan. 
Such results provide evidence for the qualitative change of the development model thanks to the 
policies, measures and programs adopted during the 10th Plan aimed at building a knowledge-
based economy.  




and General Balances  
1987  2007  
Gross Domestic Product 
(MD) 7,160  44,254  
Growth rate (at constant 
prices) -2%  4.6%  
Debt ratio 57.9%  46.1%  
Debt service 26.3%  15.4%  
Inflation rate 8%  3%  
Global investment (MD) 1,789  10,000  
National Savings (MD) 1,404.8  9,118.9  
Distribution of investment 





-         Private  
  
Sector-based distribution of 
GDP 








    11% 
17.5% 
59.8% 
-         Agriculture 
-         Non-
manufacturing 
industries 
-         Manufacturing 
industries 





   
23. PERFORMANCE OF TUNISIAN ECONOMY 1987-2007 Source: National Institute of 
Statistics   
The table show the structural change that witnessed the economy and the success of the 
stabilization of the main macroeconomic variables such as the decreasing of inflation from 8% in 
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1987 to 3% in 2007 , the decrease of debt ratio and debt service, the increase of national saving 
and the investment rate which was most shared by the private sector means there is a relative 
success of the orientation to market economy .the transformation of the economy is also marked 
by the grow of industry and services sectors and the decrease of agriculture sector in term of 
GDP distribution which trust the orientation of the government . Efforts made by the government 
to integrate its regional and international economic environment were partially achieved but 

















Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The opinion of the international financial community and any informed observer and lens, there 
is no doubt that the Tunisian economy has experienced positive qualitative changes in terms of 
both financial stability and in terms of economic restructuring (APPENDICE 3).  
Indeed, before 1986 the country was in crisis: financial crisis, fiscal crisis, debt crisis. The loss of 
the legitimacy of the regime of BOURGUIBA67, Progress of the Islamic opposition had little 
increase the implementation of structural adjustment program decided in 1986, but the broad 
consensus that realizes the new President, the unfailing support of Western powers, a favorable 
international economic conditions have given some impetus to the Tunisian economy, many 
reforms in different fields was done in order to restore growth and achieve stabilization in the 
first step. 
These reforms, which concern almost all areas, and in particular the regulatory framework, 
taxation, prices, foreign trade, investment, incentives system, the banking and financial system 
have made it possible to change the economic landscape of the country and to realize important 
qualitative and quantitative advances. 
To adhere to generally accepted economic indicators, the results are certainly the most 
convincing of controlling inflation, which decreased from 9% to 5% between 1986 and 1996 to 
achieve 3% in 2007 and the fiscal deficit from 5 to 3% over the same period. Regarding the 
growth rate, the figures are less encouraging than it has said.  
                                      
67  The first president of independent Tunisia 
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Tunisia has, indeed, experienced peak: 6.7% in 1987 (constant price), to 7.8% in 1990 and 1992, 
annual average on the entire period indicates, at best, stagnation when compared to the period of 
crisis that preceded 1986: 4% in 1982-1986, 4.2% in 1987-1991 and 3.5% in 1992 - 1996.  
For the year 1998 the growth rate of GNP would have been 5%, it also often brings forward the 
export performance of the Tunisian economy. The period 1987-1990 corresponds to an increase 
in exports of 18.7% per year. Services, especially tourism, had a very important contribution to 
this increase which explains in addition to the international situation, the adjustment measures: 
devaluation of the dinar (1993), reduction of inflation has continued compression of domestic 
consumption, lower real wages, many financial incentives and subsidies to exports. This 
dynamic, however, quickly reached its limits: the growth rate of exports do not exceed 2.4% 
between 1991 and 1993 and knows an increase in saw tooth until 1997. This curve reveals an 
indisputable fragility that can be explained by the first connection has shortness of breathe 
"effect in price competitiveness” but also has the dual polarization: concentration around a 
reduced number of products, a hand, and geographic polarization, on the other hand, since the 
EU is by far the main market of Tunisia. 
No changes in investment, nor has hardly encouraged optimism as it seems random. After a 
modest recovery of domestic investment between 1989 and 1992, the service sector has also 
been the main beneficiary; there was a significant decline between 1993 and 1995, and further 
growth the following year. FDI in Tunisia have experienced over the same period a breath from 
565.4 million Tunisian dinars in 1992 to 365.0 in 1995. while the country remains unattractive to 
foreign capital, the signing of the agreement on free trade area between Tunisia and European 
Union in July 1995 involving the progressive dismantling of tariff protection, directly threatens 
an important part of the Tunisian Industry uncompetitive by compared to imported products and 
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weighed on fiscal revenue of the state. The free trade zone, resulting in the dismantling of the 
customs guard, planned over a period of 12 years by the new Free Trade Agreement, will mean a 
medium-term shortfall of $ 4 billion for the budget us government official indicates. 
Tunisia is heavily dependent on a few EU markets. About 71 percent of its export is shipped in 
four countries in Europe: France (33 %), Italy (24 %), Germany (8 %) and Spain (5 %). Over the 
past decade, exports to France and Italy, Tunisia’s two largest export markets, have grown at a 
faster pace than the overall import growth in these countries, resulting in a 30 % increase in 
market share in both markets .However, this performance has not allowed Tunisia to increase its 
world market share, which remained quasi-constant in this period.  
Nonetheless, despite good macroeconomic policies, a qualified workforce and high-quality 
infrastructure, international observers have underscored the lack of vigor of the private sector as 
one of the country’s main weaknesses. It is essential to improve the business climate. The other 
big challenges to the Tunisian economy are: to maintain its competitiveness as it faces the rapid 
opening of its markets to European competition and employment. The unemployment rate 
exceeds an average of 14 per cent and particularly affects women and graduates from higher 
education. 
As a signatory of several structural adjustment programs, Tunisia has managed its first phase to 
restore the major macroeconomic balances (reduction of inflation, budget deficit, the debt service 
and restoration of growth). However, the second phase, structural reforms including the 
liberalization (foreign trade and public sector) is the linchpin remains partial. Tunisia was in 
timidly that encourage privatization. Over 250 public enterprises privatized between 1986 and 
1998, 77 have been effectively.  
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Process of privatization initially concerned the public enterprises of small and medium sizes 
continuous. Revenues from these privatizations have generated only $ 570 million until 1998. 
Disposal of businesses say strategy began in 1998 with the sale of two major cement plants 
worth 400 million U.S. dollars.  
The free trade zone was expected to give a boost to adjustment by speeding up the privatization 
component. This could be translated only by reinforce of trends has been working since the early 
80's know the deepening of social inequality and the weakening of the regulatory function of the 
state. 
casting new light on the development strategies adopted by Tunisia since the 70s, a Tunisian 
economist (Hakim Ben Hammouda) questioned the effectiveness of structural adjustment plan, 
implemented in 1987, he say that one can notice that the economy is "on track" according to the 
experts of IMF, it would be "the best risk Maghreb, " added the French company CEUs 
insurance for Foreign Trade (Coface), a recent country risk report show a high risk especially in 
the financial system (Appendice 5). The fact remains that foreign capital inflows have remained 
modest and concentrated in the energy field. 
Integration into the global economy, especially the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with 
the European Union has changed the conditions of competitiveness to the detriment of Tunisia. 
What are internal factors blocking are? Low diversification of exports, which remain dependent 
on textiles, the erosion of the preferential position of the country on the European market, which 
he enjoyed since 1976, combined with new data from the global economy (openness of the 
countries of eastern and of multilateralism). This will lead to shortness of dynamics. 
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The revival of a strong and sustainable growth can be achieved without maintaining a stable 
macroeconomic framework and without the completion of structural reforms aimed at private 
sector development and better integration into the international economy.  
Great efforts have been made in the direction of encouraging investment and especially FDI.        
"There is no development without a good amount of investment,” it is these belief economic 
experts which led Tunisia for many years to reflect seriously on this issue and develop 
appropriate approaches. Then place comprehensive reforms: economic, fiscal, administrative, 
legislative ... not to mention the significant financial incentives. 
Overall we can conclude that Tunisia’s positive performance in general can be attributed to for 
main factors: 
? Implementation of reforms and stabilization program , particularly financial and trade 
liberalization , which significantly improved the competitiveness of Tunisian economy  
? The priority given to social policies –the development of  education and social security , 
the attention devoted to health and the aid given to poorest of the population  
? The slowdown of the population growth through the enhancement of women status and 
education policies 
? Continuing investment in basic infrastructure 
The major results registered for the 9th Development Plan (1997-2001), the 10th Development 
Plan (2002-2006) and during the current 11th Development Plan (2007-2011) confirm the 
capacity of the Tunisian economy to adapt to new demands and to face the challenges of the 
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future and in keeping with the country’s adhesion to the World Trade Organization and the 
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APPENDICE 6: 8th plan‘s statistics (92-96) 
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